Three Essays on the Economics of Foreign Aid by Song, Hongwei
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
ScholarWorks@UARK
Theses and Dissertations
7-2015
Three Essays on the Economics of Foreign Aid
Hongwei Song
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd
Part of the International Economics Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by
an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact scholar@uark.edu, ccmiddle@uark.edu.
Recommended Citation
Song, Hongwei, "Three Essays on the Economics of Foreign Aid" (2015). Theses and Dissertations. 1310.
http://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd/1310
Three Essays on the Economics of Foreign Aid 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics 
 
by 
 
Hongwei Song 
Harbin Institute of Technology 
Bachelor of Science in Economics, 2006 
Harbin Institute of Technology 
Master of Arts in Economics, 2008 
University of North Carolina at Pembroke 
Master of Business Administration, 2010 
 
 
July 2015 
University of Arkansas 
 
 
This dissertation is approved for recommendation to the Graduate Council. 
 
_________________________________ 
Dr. Andrew W. Horowitz 
Dissertation Director 
 
 
_____________________________________     ________________________________ 
Dr. Raja Kali                                                           Dr. Jingping Gu 
Committee Member                                                Committee Member 
   
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Recent years have seen a burgeoning interest in the issue of foreign aid especially in the context of 
developmental economics. As foreign aid is designed to help those less-privileged nations with 
developmental objectives such as poverty reduction and/or economic growth, fundamental questions 
include whether aid has been effective and what motivates donors to provide aid. This dissertation is 
composed of three essays that examine different issues concerning foreign aid. First, I focus on the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and its impact on aid allocation among sectors. If specification of 
the MDGs affected aid flows, it should be observed that more financial resources were given after the 
MDGs were announced. Moreover, sectors associated with the MDGs should have received more aid. 
Second, researchers do not agree on the effect of aid on the recipient countries’ economic growth. I apply 
social network theory to analyze the aid environment as a two-mode network. Network-based indicators 
are developed to capture aid connectivity and I find a positive relationship between the aid connectivity 
and the recipient countries’ average annual growth of GDP. Third, I look at two donors (South Korea and 
Turkey) who have transitioned from aid recipients to donors. Having experienced rapid economic 
development while receiving foreign assistance, these two nations may have a better understanding of 
how to make aid more effective for recipients. I then compared their aid allocation patterns with traditional 
donors. 
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1 Essay 1: Flows and Allocation of Foreign Aid - the Impact of Millennium 
Development Goals 
1.1 Introduction 
The last few years have seen a burgeoning interest in the issue of foreign aid especially in the 
context of developmental economics. The general idea behind foreign aid is to allow the flow of financial 
resources from the wealthier nations to the less-privileged ones in order to help with developmental 
objectives such as poverty reduction and/or economic growth. Along this line, at the dawn of the new 
millennium, all member states of the United Nations (UN) made a promise to promote peace, eradicate 
poverty, protect the environment, improve human rights, protect the vulnerable, and meet the special 
needs of Africa (United Nations Millennium Declaration, 2000). This pledge turned into the eight 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
Thirteen years have passed, and there are many discussions on the MDGs progress based on 
time frames along with suggested interventions. It is supported by many papers that most of the MDGs 
cannot be met with the current resources available in low-income countries (Dodd & Cassels, 2006; 
Hogan et al., 2010; Sahn & Stifel, 2003). Suggestions were given on how to help meet MDGs such as 
higher levels of aid commitment and improvement of aid effectiveness (Bourguignon, 2008; Clemens et 
al., 2007; Dodd & Cassels, 2006). Moreover, attentions were given to the importance of defining success. 
Easterly (2009) argues that the simple definition of success in achieving MDGs may make Africa look like 
a failure even when the progress the continent made was above the historical experience of other 
regions. Fukuda-Parr and Greenstein (2013) also pointed out that the definition of success should not be 
based on achieving the goals but on the pace of the progress with which African countries actually 
outperformed the global averages.   
This essay analyzes MDGs from a different perspective. I want to examine the impact of MDGs 
not only on aid volumes but also on aid allocation among sectors. This essay first looks at whether donor 
countries have been giving more overall support and resources to developing countries after MDGs were 
announced, and then studied whether the allocation of these resources across sectors had in fact 
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considered MDGs. In summary, this essay attempts to test the null-hypothesis that the announcement 
and adoption of the MDGs had no effect time-path to achieving these goals. In the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC) Creditor 
Reporting System (CRS), 198 aid sectors are reported from the education policy and administrative 
management to the promotion of development awareness. Foreign aid sectors are linked to specific goals 
based on the key words and indicators of MDGs. As a robustness check, aid sectors are linked to MDGs 
based on the donors’ reports on their objectives of aid activities. Two goals were looked at specifically: 
promoting gender equality and empowering women (MDG3) and ensuring environmental sustainability 
(MDG7). Disaggregated aid as share of total aid was also examined.  
Difference-in-Difference approach is adopted to identify the treatment effect of whether the aid 
allocation across sectors is in line with the MDGs. The announcement may have an impact on the aid 
amount overall. In addition, if the aid allocation among sectors took the MDGs as guidelines, the 
treatment effect should be observed, where the increase of the MDG-related sectors is more than that of 
the non-MDG-related sectors after the goals were announced. The results show that although more aid 
was given after the announcement it failed to find evidence that the aid allocation among sectors is in 
accordance with the MDGs on either levels or shares. Furthermore, donors behave differently and have 
different priorities on aid targets. Germany, Norway, and Sweden have priorities on gender equality and 
women empowerment. Regarding environmental sustainability, DAC donors in general did allocate more 
resources to support this goal, but even more resources were distributed to other sectors. Significant 
donors such as the United States, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, Norway, Netherlands, 
and Sweden actually allocated less resources to sectors which are associated with ensuring 
environmental sustainability compared with the levels before the MDGs were announced. 
This essay is organized in the following way. Section 2 provides a review of related literature. 
Section 3 introduces a model on how foreign aid is allocated and the application of difference-in-
difference approach to the model, which yields a testable empirical estimation. Section 4 provides more 
details about the data, how aid sectors are linked with the MDG goals, and the empirical results. Section 
5 concludes the essay.      
 3 
 
1.2 Literature and Related Background  
“The Millennium Declaration” was adopted in 2000 and this declaration essentially involved 
translating fundamental values which are essential to international relations in the 21st century viz., 
freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature, and shared responsibility into more concrete 
actionable pledges (United Nations Millennium Declaration, 2000). Accordingly, all 189 member states of 
the United Nations made a promise to promote peace, eradicate poverty, protect the environment, 
improve human rights, protect the vulnerable, and meet the special needs of Africa (United Nations 
Millennium Declaration, 2000). This pledge turned into eight MDGs. These eight international 
development goals were agreed upon by all the world’s countries and leading development institutions 
with a target date by the end of 2015. Each goal has specific targets and the overall 8 goals and 18 
targets are listed in Table 1.1. The origin of these goals and targets involves efforts from Assistant 
Secretary-General Michael Doyle and his team such as the United Nations Development Group (UNDP), 
the OECD, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Health Organization 
(McArthur, 2013).  
Table 1.1  
Millennium Development Goals and Targets 
Goal Target 
GOAL 1: Eradicate 
extreme poverty and 
hunger 
Target 1.A: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people 
whose income is less than $1.25 a day. 
Target 1.B: Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for 
all, including women and young people. 
Target 1.C: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who 
suffer from hunger. 
GOAL 2: Achieve 
universal primary 
education 
Target 2.A: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls 
alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling. 
GOAL 3: Promote gender 
equality and empower 
women 
Target 3.A: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary 
education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 
2015. 
GOAL 4: Reduce child 
mortality 
Target 4.A: Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five 
mortality rate. 
GOAL 5: Improve 
maternal health 
Target 5.A: Reduce by three quarters the maternal mortality ratio. 
Target 5.B: Achieve universal access to reproductive health. 
GOAL 6: Combat 
HIV/AIDS, Malaria and 
other diseases 
Target 6.A: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of 
HIV/AIDS. 
Target 6.B: Achieve, by 2010, universal access to treatment for HIV/AIDS 
for all those who need it. 
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Table 1.1 (Cont.) 
Millennium Development Goals and Targets  
Goal Target 
GOAL 6 
Target 6.C: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of 
malaria and other major diseases. 
GOAL 7: Ensure 
environmental 
sustainability 
Target 7.A: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into 
country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental 
resources. 
Target 7.B: Reduce biodiversity loss, achieving, by 2010, a significant 
reduction in the rate of loss. 
Target 7.C: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of the population without 
sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation. 
Target 7.D: Achieve, by 2020, a significant improvement in the lives of at 
least 100 million slum dwellers. 
GOAL 8: Develop a global 
partnership for 
development 
Target 8.A: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-
discriminatory trading and financial system. 
Target 8.B: Address the special needs of least developed countries. 
Target 8.C: Address the special needs of landlocked developing countries 
and small island developing States. 
Target 8.D: Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing 
countries through national and international measures in order to make 
debt sustainable in the long term. 
Target 8.E: In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide 
access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries. 
Target 8.F: In cooperation with the private sector, make available the 
benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications. 
Note. Retrieved from http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Host.aspx?Content=indicators/officiallist.htm 
The OECD is related with MDGs as the objective of OECD has been to encourage cooperation 
and promote economic and social well-being of people around the world. Moreover, its DAC has provided 
financial resources and assistance in the form of concessional loans and grants to the low income 
countries since 1960s, known as foreign aid or Official Development Assistance (ODA). In addition to a 
state’s self-effort, foreign aid from developed countries can help accelerate the progress in achieving the 
MDGs. The OECD’s supports are made through financing the MDGs, building a global partnership for 
development, and supporting strategic areas of progress (OECD website). 
There are two broad streams of research which have studied foreign aid and MDGs. The first 
stream of research looks at the MDGs progress based on the time frames along with suggested 
interventions. Sachs and McArthur (2005) looks at the progress that was made, with regards to the MDGs 
across countries, and finds that the performance had large disparities. For example, East and South Asia 
made remarkable progress, while Sub-Sahara African countries were far off-track. They also estimated 
the amount of foreign aid required in order to achieve MDGs. Considering a substantial increase in 
 5 
 
domestic resource mobilization in all developing countries, required aid levels are $135 billion in 2006, 
$152 billion in 2010, and $195 billion in 2015. Dodd and Cassels (2006) focuses on health-related MDGs. 
They point out that low-income countries cannot meet MDGs with their current resources and present aid 
volume. In addition to an increase in aid volume, donors should also make their aid more effective such 
as reducing the volatility of aid. If the aid volume is less likely to change, recipient countries can make 
more long-term plans such as widening access to AIDS treatment or scaling up health-service provision. 
Clemens et al. (2007) argues that more volume of aid is necessary but not sufficient for the MDGs to be 
achieved. Other conditions also need to be materialized such as the constituency for sustained 
engagement with poor countries. Bourguignon (2008) supports the need for greater aid from donors, and 
in addition concentrates on the ways to improve aid effectiveness in reaching the MDGs. 
Another stream of research looks at the impact of MDGs on the aid allocation among its 
recipients. Radelet (2004) takes the normative approach and argues that donors should make their aid 
more MDG oriented. Donors should select their recipients based on the recipients’ poverty level and 
quality of governance rather than the donors’ strategic and commercial considerations. Furthermore, 
donors should provide recipients which have better governance with more long-term aid and allow such 
recipients to have more control in designing their aid projects. Baulch (2006) focuses on four indicators of 
MDGs including monetary poverty, child malnutrition, primary school enrollments, and under-five 
mortality, and assesses whether aid was allocated to recipients which needed it the most regarding 
MDGs. Drawing aid concentration curves with data from 2000-2002, the finding suggests that in general 
donors allocated much less aid to the countries than what MDGs indicators had suggested. Moreover, 
donors behave differently and some did not allocate aid in a way that is consistent with MDGs. The World 
Bank and the United Kingdom allocated two-thirds of their concessionary aid to low-income countries, 
while the United States and the European Commission distributed majority of their aid to middle-income 
countries which already met or were on track in achieving the goals.  
In contrast to the use of aggregate foreign aid in the above literature, a few papers adopted 
disaggregated aid in analyzing the impact of MDGs on aid allocation and/or aid effectiveness. Thiele et al. 
(2007) disaggregated aid by sectors and evaluated whether aid committed in the period from 2002-2004 
helped in meeting the MDGs. The sectorial aid were linked with the MDGs both at a more general level 
 6 
 
and at a specific level. Take primary schooling as an example (MDG2). A relatively general way to link aid 
sectors to MDG3 is to look at aid given to education sectors; a relatively specific link would be the aid 
given to basic education. Indicators of need are then used to explain to what extent donors distributed aid 
in accordance with recipient countries’ needs regarding the MDGs. Results show that donors considered 
fight against HIV/AIDS (MDG6) when distributing aid, while other MDGs such as primary education were 
hardly considered. Nunnenkamp and Ohler (2011) also uses disaggregated aid in examining aid 
effectiveness in reducing the numbers of HIV-related deaths and new infections (MDG6). They also 
disaggregated aid by sectors and only used aid from sectors which are associated with sexually 
transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS control. Although it fails to find evidence of aid in preventing HIV-
related new infections, it presents that bilateral aid helped alleviate the number of HIV-related death while 
multilateral aid did not. Hailu and Tsukada (2012) disaggregates aid by bilateral flows and multilateral 
flows and examines whether aid was allocated to the countries which are further away from achieving the 
MDGs. Applying correlation analysis, graphical analysis, and concentration curves, they find that aid 
allocation has become more MDG-sensitive i.e. aid was allocated to the countries which needed it the 
most.     
The advantage of using disaggregated aid is that sector-specific aid should be more effective 
when analyzing its impact in helping specific goals. This essay assigns aid sectors to link with MDGs 
based on the key words in not only the goals but also its indicators. Moreover, as a robustness check, 
linkages are also established based on donors’ reports on their policy objectives of aid activities. This 
essay also have a different perspective in analyzing the impact of MDGs on aid allocation. The focus is 
on the change of aid allocation among sectors. When the amount of resources given to a sector 
increases, the sector as share of total aid may decrease. To make a more precise analysis of the change 
in aid allocation among sectors, this essay examines the change at both the volume level and the share 
level. Difference-in-Difference approach is adopted to identify not only whether a sector has expanded 
after the MDGs were announced but also whether the change of the MDG-related sectors exceeds the 
chance of the non-MDG-related sectors. 
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1.3 Model and Estimation Strategy 
This essay follows a hybrid model which includes variables of both the donors’ interest and the 
recipients’ needs. Dudley and Montmarquette (1976) first develops this model from the supply side of aid 
and the model was used and extended later serving a number of different research objectives. For 
example, Alesina and Dollar (2002) finds empirically that colonial past and political alliances are 
significant aid motivation, rather than the recipient countries’ economic needs or policy performance. 
Gates and Hoeffler (2004) presents evidence that Nordic donors (Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland) 
tend to give more aid to democracies and to recipients with a good human rights record. This model 
serves this essay in a way that it controls the motivation of aid before and after the announcement of 
MDGs and allows me to focus only on the change of aid allocation among sectors.   
Assuming that there is no administrative cost and only one good is consumed in the donor 
country other than foreign aid, donor i gets utility from the consumption of good X and the consumption of 
the subjectively measured impact of foreign aid A.  
   =  (  ,  )                                                                                                                               (1.1) 
  = ∑    = ∑  (  ,   ,   ,     ,   ,   )
 
   
 
                                                                                    (1.2) 
where   is the sum of the subjectively measured impact of foreign aid from donor i to m recipient 
countries;    is the population of recipient j;    is aid per capita from donor i to recipient j;    is GDP per 
capita of recipient j;      is the export of donor i to recipient j;    is aid from other donors to recipient j;    
is the political links between donor i and recipient j. More specifically, the impact function takes the 
following form: 
   =   
   
  
  
 
 
    
   
∅ ∏   
   
         0 ≤   ≤ 1, 0 ≤   < 1,   > 0, ∅ > 0,    > 1                           (1.3) 
where    = 0 if there are no type k political links between donor i and recipient j,   = 1, … ,   and    = 1 if 
there are type k political links between donor i and recipient j,   = 1, … ,  . The donor country i also faces a 
budget constraint of his own national income:  
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   + ∑     
 
    =                                                                                                                        (1.4) 
To maximize his utility, donor i has the following first order condition: 
  
  
=
 
      ∏   
   
    
  
     
   
  
 
                                                                                                  (1.5) 
where     and     are the partial derivatives of    with respect to   and   . Equation (1.5) may be 
interpreted as the price of weighted foreign aid impact   in terms of other goods    foregone.  In 
equilibrium the price of weighted aid impact in each recipient should be identical.  
 
      ∏   
   
    
  
     
   
  
 
=       = 1, …                                                                                     (1.6) 
where   is the marginal rate of substitution between the foreign aid and other good. The optical amount of 
per capita aid from donor i to recipient j is given by equation (1.7). 
   =  
      
    
∅ ∏   
   
   
  
   
     
 
(   ) 
                                                                                                  (1.7) 
Taking the natural logarithm of equation (1.7) yields the optimal amount of foreign aid from donor 
i to recipient j.  
     =    +        +        +          +        + ∑      +   
 
                                                (1.8) 
This model helps explain to what extent the amount of aid given to a recipient country is 
determined by the recipient’s economic performance and population, the donor’s economic interest and 
historical ties with the recipient, as well as the donor’s political consideration of other donors’ impact. This 
essay performs the difference-in-difference approach on equation (1.8) to examine empirically the impact 
of MDGs on foreign aid allocation across sectors. This method is appropriate here because it can 
combine two comparisons: before and after the MDGs were announced; and sector-specific aid which are 
associated with MDGs and those which are not associated with MDGs. Moreover, before-after 
comparison and with-without comparison help remove the time trend and the country effect. This essay is 
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particularly interested in examining whether the sectors which are associated with the MDGs have 
expanded faster than those which are not associated with them.  
     =    +        +        +          +        + ∑      +   2   +       +
 
   
  (2   ∗   ) +                                                                                                                                    (1.9) 
Equation (1.9) is to be estimated adopting difference-in-difference method. Indicator variables 
include 2  ,    , and (2   ∗   ). 2   takes a value of 1 if aid is given to a recipient country after year 
2000 and a value of 0 otherwise.     takes a value of 1 if the sector-specific aid sector is associated 
with MDGs and a value of 0 otherwise. Addressing the null hypothesis, the coefficient    indicates the 
change of sectors that are not associated with MDGs after the announcement was made; the coefficient 
(   +   ) indicates the change of sectors that are associated with MDGs after the announcement was 
made; and the coefficient    indicates the relative change between these two groups of sectors. For 
instance, if    > 0, it would indicate that the donor allocated more resources to sectors which are not 
associated with MDGs after the announcement; if    +    > 0, it would indicate that the donor allocated 
more resources to sectors that are associated with MDGs after year 2000; if    > 0, it would indicate that 
the change of sectors which are associated with MDGs exceeds the change of sectors which are not 
associated with MDGs.  
Much of the prior works on aid effectiveness in promoting economic growth in developing 
countries have been criticized due to the non-random assignment of aid (Clemens et al., 2012; Deaton, 
2010; Rajan & Subramanian, 2008). However, the endogeneity issue is less concerned for this study 
because the focus here is on testing whether aid allocation among sectors has changed after the 
announcement of MDGs and it is unlikely that the unobserved donor motivation would change in this time 
span. A better estimation strategy could be Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) and thus valid instruments 
are required. The main variables used as instruments in the aid literature include political links, lagged aid 
flows, and the population size of recipients and it is well explained in Clemens et al. (2012) that these 
instrumental variables are quite questionable. The econometrics problem of employing weak instruments 
was understood (Bound et al., 1995). Addressing the possibility of endogeneity, I follow Wooldridge 
(2003) to introduce a one-year lag in dependent variables. Wooldridge (2003) states that if we assume 
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that the error term is uncorrelated with all past endogenous and exogenous variables then lagged 
endogenous variables are treated as predetermined variables and they are uncorrelated with error term. 
Equation (1.10) will be estimated in the next section. 
      =    +           +           +             +           + ∑         +   2   +       +
 
   
  (2   ∗   ) +                                                                                                                                 (1.10) 
1.4 Data and Results 
1.4.1 Data and Linkages between Sectors and MDGs 
As a measure of foreign aid, this essay follows the definition of ODA provided by OECD and use 
disaggregated aid data drawn from CRS of OECD database for the period of 1995 to 2012. CRS dataset 
records not only the overall commitment amount, but also the disaggregated sector-specific aid such as 
Malaria control, basic drinking water supply, and basic sanitation. The advantage of using aid data at the 
disaggregated level is that I can then look at each sector and see whether it is associated with MDGs. 
Commitment data are favored for the following reasons: donor communities have more control on aid and 
the commitment data better reflect donors’ intention and preference (McGillivray & White, 1993; Tarp et 
al., 1999).  Actual disbursement, on the other hand, may be constrained by recipients’ absorptive 
capacity. Hudson (2013) suggests that almost all commitments tend to be met within two years on 
average with the overwhelming majority met immediately. In addition, the correlation between 
commitment and disbursement is 0.8.  Figure 1.1 shows the DAC aid commitment flows over time and it 
is obvious that the donors promise different amount of financial resources. This essay looks at the total 
amount provided by DAC and then only focuses on significant donors in terms of aid volume. These 
donors include the United States, Norway, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and 
Netherland. The Export data are from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 
while data on population, GDP per capita are from Penn World Table (PWT 7.1). Data on political links 
are from Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).   
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Figure 1.1 DAC Aid Commitment Flows (constant price) 
This essay assigns aid sectors to link with MDGs based on the key words in not only the goals 
but also its indicators. For example, MDG2 is to achieve universal primary education. A specific aid sector 
recorded in OECD is exactly primary education. The linkages are clear when the goals and targets 
coincide with aid sectors. However, defining MDG-related sectors may be arguable when the goals are 
not perfectly coincide with aid sectors. For example, MDG3 targets to eliminate gender disparity in 
education. In addition to aid from sectors of education or basic education, one may argue that aid from 
other sectors may also relate to this goal. Aid given to institutions working for gender equality and 
women’s empowerment is one such example. Aid given to support and apply legislation designed to 
prevent recruiting child soldier is another example. Even aid given to agrarian reform could help. 
Therefore, the arbitrary link between aid sectors and MDGs may influence the results. This essay 
therefore uses a narrow definition and links sectors with MDGs only if the explanation of the sectors 
provided by OECD coincides with the key words in MDGs and its indicators. There are overall 8 goals, 21 
targets, and 60 indicators. Table 1.2 is one example of MDG6 with the goal, targets, and indicators; and 
Table 1.3 shows the linkages between sectors and MDGs used in this essay for the sixth goal as an 
example. 
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Table 1.2  
MDG6 and its Targets and Indicators 
MDG6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases 
Target 6.A: Have halted by 2015 and begun to 
reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS 
1. HIV prevalence among population aged 15-24  
2. Condom use at last high-risk sex 
3. Proportion of population aged 15-24 years 
with comprehensive correct knowledge of 
HIV/AIDS 
4. Ratio of school attendance of orphans to 
school attendance of non-orphans aged 10-14 
years 
Target 6.B: Achieve, by 2010, universal access to 
treatment for HIV/AIDS for all those who need it 
1. Proportion of population with advanced HIV 
infection with access to antiretroviral drugs 
Target 6.C: Have halted by 2015 and begun to 
reverse the incidence of malaria and other major 
diseases 
1. Incidence and death rates associated with 
malaria 
2. Proportion of children under 5 sleeping under 
insecticide-treated bednets 
3. Proportion of children under 5 with fever who 
are treated with appropriate anti-malarial 
drugs 
4. Incidence, prevalence and death rates 
associated with tuberculosis 
5. Proportion of tuberculosis cases detected and 
cured under directly observed treatment  short 
course 
Note. Retrieved from http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Host.aspx?Content=indicators/officiallist.htm 
Table 1.3  
Linkages between Sectors and MDGs 
MDG6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases 
Target 6.A: Have halted by 2015 and begun to 
reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS 
 13040 STD control including HIV/AIDS 
 13030 Family planning 
 12261 Health education 
 16010 Social/welfare services 
 16064 Social mitigation of HIV/AIDS 
 12262 Malaria control 
 12263 Tuberculosis control 
Target 6.B: Achieve, by 2010, universal access to 
treatment for HIV/AIDS for all those who need it 
Target 6.C: Have halted by 2015 and begun to 
reverse the incidence of malaria and other major 
diseases 
1.4.2 Main Results 
When looking at DAC overall, it appears that the total amount of aid to all developing countries 
increased dramatically since the new millennium (see Figure 1.2). Following the model used in the 
literature, Table 1.4 confirms that there is a statistically significant increase in the intercept after 2000. 
The results also confirms some findings in the literature. For instance, wealthier countries get less aid; 
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countries with large population get less aid (population bias); trade relationship with donors is associated 
with more aid. If I select the year 2001 to run the test, the findings are consistent. It could be arguable that 
the selection of year is arbitrary, so CUSUM test is adopted to test for structure changes. Figure 1.3 
shows that without any time assumption, the data alone suggest a structural change around 2000/2001.    
 
Figure 1.2 Foreign Aid from DAC (constant price) 
Table 1.4  
Test for changes in total aid 
 Coefficient Standard Errors  
GDP(lagged) -.696*** .019 
Population(lagged) -.167*** .009 
Export(lagged) .44*** .006 
East Asia .716*** .059 
Sub Sahara -.146*** .050 
D .268*** .037 
constant 7.069*** .209 
*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01. 
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Figure 1.3 Test for structure change 
Although the motivations of foreign aid are rather complex, they mainly determine which country 
will receive aid. Once the donor-recipient relationships are formed, donors may or may not mind the 
allocation of aid by different sectors. An important question therefore is to check whether donor countries 
were targeting the MDGs when allocating foreign assistance. This essay first disaggregates aid sectors 
into two broader groups: sectors which are associated with MDGs (hereafter MDG-sectors) and sectors 
which are not associated with MDGs (hereafter non-MDG-sectors), there are 76 MDG-sectors, 117 non-
MDG-sectors, and 4 unspecified sectors. Figure 1.4 compares the aid flows from MDG-sectors with those 
from non-MDG-sectors. It appears that the sectors which are associated with MDGs got expanded 
significantly in early 2000s then slowed down in late 2000s although the level is still much higher than 
1990s. Table 1.5 uses pooled regression as well as random effect model and it confirms that both sectors 
got expanded after 2000 but it fails to support that MDG-sectors increased more than the non-MDG-
sectors. In addition, maintaining the same control group, if we look at each of the eight goals, treatment 
effects are found only in MDG2, MDG3, MDG7, and MDG8 for DAC in general (see Table 1.6), which 
means the change in aid volume supporting primary education, gender equality, environmental 
sustainability, and global partnership for development is more that the change in aid volume to the 
sectors which are not associated with MDGs.      
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Figure 1.4 Aid flows to MDG-sectors and non-MDG-sectors (constant price) 
Table 1.5  
DAC Result for MDG-sectors and non-MDG-sectors 
 
Pooled Regression Random Effect Model 
MDG Non-MDG MDG Non-MDG 
GDP(lagged) -.61*** -.65*** -.40*** -.16*** 
Population(lagged) -.30*** -.30*** -.16*** -.19*** 
Export(lagged) .05** -.23*** .23*** -.10** 
East Asia .66*** .61*** .96*** 1.28*** 
Sub Sahara .09 -.47*** .73*** .35* 
D .37*** .41*** .29*** .26*** 
cons 8.95*** 10.03*** 4.90*** 4.75*** 
Prob>chi2 0.6258 0.3134 
*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01. 
Furthermore, this essay analyzes eight significant donors: the United States, France, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, Japan, Norway, Netherlands, and Sweden and examines their aid allocation patterns. 
Most of these eight donors allocated aid to less wealthy countries, countries with less population, countries 
which have trade relations with the donor, countries which have political links with the donor, and countries 
which received aid from other donors (see one example in Table 1.7). The exception is the failure to find 
population bias for Germany and the United Kingdom. The results for each individual donor are summarized 
in Table 1.8. Positive treatment effect was found for France in all MDGs, which implies that France’s aid 
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allocation across sectors is perfectly in line with MDGs.  Negative treatment effect was found for the United 
States, Germany, Norway, and Sweden in all eight goals, which suggests that the change of aid in MDG-
sectors is less than that in non-MDG-sectors. 
Table 1.6  
MDG-specific Results for DAC 
 MDG1 MDG2 MDG3 MDG4 MDG5 MDG6 MDG7 MDG8 
GDP(lagged) -.42*** -.42*** -.49*** -.43*** -.04*** -.40*** -.49*** -.48*** 
Population(lagged) -.13*** -.14*** -.21*** -.15*** -.28*** -.12*** -.23*** -.17*** 
Export(lagged) .04*** .07*** .12*** .00 .38 .02 .13*** .06*** 
East Asia -.10** .01 .15*** -.02 -1.41 -.01 .08 .06 
Sub Sahara -.15*** -.24*** -.24*** -.27*** .04*** -.24*** -.22*** -.25*** 
2nd .35*** .36*** .38*** .36*** 7.76*** .35*** .38*** .37*** 
MDG -1.82*** -2.06*** -1.91*** -1.59*** -1.41*** -1.85*** -1.66*** -1.49*** 
2nd*MDG -.25*** -.14** .05 .03 .04 -.01 -.23*** -.22*** 
Cons  6.54*** 6.59*** 7.73*** 6.74*** 7.76*** 6.25*** 7.85*** 7.32*** 
*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01. 
Table 1.7  
Result for USA for MDG-sectors 
 MDG-sectors 
GDP(lagged) -.22*** 
Population(lagged) -.06*** 
Export(lagged) .06*** 
Military aid (lagged) .21*** 
Bandwagon (lagged) .06*** 
2nd .57*** 
MDG -.09 
2nd*MDG -.26*** 
Cons  1.62*** 
*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01. 
It is notable that the treatment effect compares only the change (not the increase of aid) between 
the control group and the treatment group. Taking a close look at all coefficients provides richer 
information. Take France as an example. Less aid was allocated to sectors which are not associated with 
MDGs, and more aid was allocated to sectors targeting MDG1 (hunger), MDG2 (primary education), 
MDG3 (gender equality) and MDG8 (global partnership). Sectors targeting MDG4 (child mortality), MDG5 
(maternal health), and MDG6 (HIV and Malaria) also got less amount of aid, but the decrease of these 
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MDG-related sectors was less than that of the non-MDG-sectors. Aid supporting environmental 
sustainability maintained the same after year 2000. The United States seemed to be following a different 
strategy. The non-MDG-sectors actually got expanded while sectors targeting six out of eight MDGs also 
got expanded although the increase in these MDG-sectors was less than that in non-MDG-sectors. The 
change in aid flows across sectors was not statistically significant for the United Kingdom and only the 
sectors targeting hunger reduction were expanded.  
Table 1.8  
MDG-specific Results for Individual Donor 
 MDG1 MDG2 MDG3 MDG4 MDG5 MDG6 MDG7 MDG8 
USA 
2nd .57*** .56*** .56*** .57*** .57*** .57*** .56*** .56*** 
MDG -.01 -.22*** -.36*** -.16*** -.18*** -.01 -.35*** -.37*** 
2nd*MDG -.54*** -.66*** -.6*** -.41*** -.39*** -.52*** -.55*** -.54*** 
France 
2nd -.10*** -.10*** -.10*** -.10*** -.10*** -.10*** -.10*** -.09*** 
MDG -.51*** -.45*** -.43*** -.47*** -.40*** -.46*** -.36*** -.24*** 
2nd*MDG .13*** .11*** .37*** .09*** .07** .09*** .10*** .10*** 
Japan 
2nd .12*** .11*** .10*** .11*** .10*** .10*** .11*** .10*** 
MDG .04 -.39*** -.32*** -.46*** -.42*** -.41*** -.06 -.33*** 
2nd*MDG .01 -.04 -.16*** -.05 -.03 -.14*** -.12** -.09* 
Germany 
2nd .12*** .12*** .11*** .12*** .12*** .12*** .11*** .11*** 
MDG -.23*** -.18*** -.15*** -.22*** -.22*** -.21*** -.06** -.06** 
2nd*MDG -.14*** -.17*** -.05* -.14*** -.13*** -.14*** -.15*** -.14*** 
UK 
2nd -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.01 
MDG -.10*** -.30*** -.29*** -.28*** -.26*** -.30*** -.28*** -.16*** 
2nd*MDG .05* .01 .01 .03 .02 .04 .00 .00 
Netherlands 
2nd .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 
MDG -.22*** -.14*** -.18*** -.18*** -.14*** -.18*** -.11*** -.13*** 
2nd*MDG -.01 -.04 -.02 -.02 -.05 -.03 -.05 -.07*** 
Norway 
2nd .05*** .05*** .05*** .05*** .05*** .05*** .05*** .05*** 
MDG -.19*** -.15*** -.16*** -.16*** -.15*** -.16*** -.14*** -.16*** 
2nd*MDG -.04* -.05*** -.04** -.04** -.04* -.04** -.05** -.05*** 
Sweden 
2nd .05*** .05*** .05*** .05*** .05*** .05*** .05*** .05*** 
MDG -.18*** -.14*** -.15*** -.16*** -.15*** -.16*** -.15*** -.15*** 
2nd*MDG -.04** -.06*** -.05*** -.04** -.05** -.05** -.06*** -.05** 
*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01. 
 18 
 
The more altruistic donors also did not appear to align their aid distribution with the MDGs. More 
specifically, Norway increased its aid to all sectors although non-MDG-sectors got more resources than 
the MDG-sectors. Sweden increased its aid to non-MDG-sectors but maintained similar aid volume to 
most of the MDG-sectors. Netherlands did not change its aid distribution.     
1.4.3 Robustness Check  
As a robustness check, linkages are also established based on donors’ reports on their policy 
objectives of aid activities. However, OECD only provides data on two goals: MDG3 and MDG7. Again 
using gender equality (MDG3) as an example. According to OECD, donors were requested to indicate 
explicitly to CRS whether an aid activity considers gender equality as the policy objectives (specifically 
principal objective, significant objective, not targeted, or not screened/reported). This essay defines that a 
sector targets MDG3 if more than 50% of the resources in this sector report gender equality as principal 
or significant objectives. Similarly, it defines a sector to be not targeting MDG3 if less than 5% of the 
resources in this sector report gender equality as principal or significant objectives. 
Aligning aid sectors with MDGs using donors’ report, the results in Table 1.9 and Table 1.10 are 
consistent with the main results in general. The slight change is the finding of positive treatment effect for 
Germany, Netherlands, and Sweden regarding gender equality and the finding of negative treatment 
effect for France regarding environmental sustainability.    
Table 1.9  
Results for MDG3 with Linkages Based on Donors’ Reports 
 
Arbitrary 
Link 
Non-arbitrary Link (level) Non-arbitrary Link (share) 
Treatment 
effect 
Non-
MDG3 
MDG3 
Treatment 
Effect 
Non-
MDG3 
MDG3 
Treatment 
Effect 
DAC .05 .04 .079 .039 -.004 0 .004 
US -.6*** .129*** -.029*** -.158*** .041*** -.001*** -.051*** 
France .37*** -.047*** -.004*** .043*** -.028*** -.003*** .025*** 
Germany -.05* -.037*** .004*** .041*** -.022*** .001*** .023*** 
UK .01 -.014*** -.005*** .009* -.009*** -.005*** .004 
Japan -.05 -.005 -.011 -.006 .002 -.004 -.006 
Norway -.04** -.006** .005** .011** -.001 0 .001 
Netherlands -.02 -.028*** -.008*** .020** -.021*** -.002*** .019*** 
Sweden -.05*** -.005*** .003*** .008*** -.01*** 0*** .010*** 
*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01. 
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Table 1.10  
Results for MDG7 with Linkages Based on Donors’ Reports 
 Arbitrary 
Link 
Non-arbitrary Link (level) Non-arbitrary Link (share) 
Treatment 
effect 
Non-
MDG3 
MDG3 
Treatment 
Effect 
Non-
MDG3 
MDG3 
Treatment 
Effect 
DAC -.23*** .435*** .07*** -.365*** .032*** .007*** -.025** 
US -.55*** .579*** -.059*** -.638*** .217*** -.012*** -.229*** 
France .10*** .15*** -.018*** -.168*** .075*** -.033*** -.108*** 
Germany -.15*** .108*** -.045*** -.153*** .059*** -.033 -.092*** 
UK .00 .001 .004 .003 .035*** -.011*** -.046** 
Japan -.12** .207*** -.032*** -.239*** .173*** -.021*** -.194*** 
Norway -.05** .039*** 0*** -.039** .039*** -.023*** -.062*** 
Netherlands -.05 -.014 -.028 -.014 .009 -.036** -.045** 
Sweden -.06*** .046*** -.003*** -.049*** .032** -.001** -.042** 
*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01. 
So far, this essay has been using aid volumes (aid level). But as aid volumes increase, its share 
of total aid could increase, decrease, or remain the same. The United States distributed more amount of 
aid targeting both environmental sustainability and diseases such as HIV and Malaria. But when looking 
at its share of total aid, sectors which are associated with environmental protection remain 1% of its total 
aid while sectors which are associated with major diseases increased its share from 3% in 1995 to 20% in 
2011 (see Figure 1.5). This essay then runs another robustness check using sectorial aid as a share of 
total aid. The linkages are again established based on donors’ reports. The results are reported in the last 
three columns in Table 1.9 and Table 1.10. The results are consistent with the main results in general.    
 
Figure 1.5 Share of aid for USA 
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1.5 Conclusion 
This essay focuses on the Millennium Development Goals and its impact on foreign aid allocation 
among sectors. It is found that the overall aid flows has increased dramatically since the announcement. 
However, in general, there is no clear evidence that the aggregated aid allocation takes MDGs as 
guidelines. When looking at the eight most influential donors in terms of aid volume, they exhibited 
different aid distribution patterns. France contributed more resources to MDG-sectors while reducing 
resources to non-MDG-sectors. Japan and Germany devoted more resources in general but maintained 
the same aid allocation across sectors. The United States and Norway also gave more resources in 
general but the non-MDG-sectors got more aid than the MDG-sectors. The United Kingdom and 
Netherlands maintained the same aid level and sectorial distribution after year 2000. Furthermore, donors 
behave differently in terms of prioritized aid targets. For example, the United States turned its attention to 
hunger, heath environmental sustainability, and global partnership; France shifted its resources to hunger 
reduction, primary education, and gender equality, and global partnership; Norway focused more on 
hunger, gender equality, and health sectors.  
In summary, the MDGs have shaped the aid allocation of some donors, but not all donors. The 
essays try to explore the reasons in a few ways as follows. First, although donors agree that MDGs target 
important development issues, MDGs may not be accepted as the modern development norm. Donors 
may consider MDGs to some extent but may not use it as aid policy guideline. Peterson (2010) states that 
MDGs are not a best development strategy for Africa. For example, MDGs focus on social services and 
the failure to address revenue mobilization makes it financially unsustainable. Second, when 
development reaches certain levels, the marginal utility of aid on these sectors would be decreasing. 
Donors may want to devote more resources to those sectors where marginal utility still is increasing 
although these sectors may not be associated with MDGs. Third, donors may have strategic 
considerations. For example, if other donors contribute more to sectors which are associated with MDGs 
and the goals are achieved, this credit would be shared among all donors. Fourth, donors may be 
supporting sectors where they have expertise. These sectors are important although they may not be 
MDG-sectors. In the end, donors may consider MDGs less for bilateral aid instead they provide financial 
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resources to multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund and expect 
the multilateral donors to target MDGs when allocating aid to recipient countries. Donors may have such 
intention but it appears that multilateral aid distribution by sectors are not in line with MDGs either (see 
Figure 1.6).  
 
Figure 1.6 Multilateral aid allocation across sectors 
The findings in this essay are mixed and controversial. This could be caused by the non-arbitrary 
link between aid sectors and MDGs. Further analysis could be done if donors’ report are published on all 
eight goals. But the findings also help explain why some goals are hard to achieve than others. The 
reason could be that resources were not fully devoted to the sectors which are associated with MDGs. In 
addition, it opens further discussion on important questions such as aid effectiveness and donor co-
operation. Maybe huge amount of aid itself has limitations and donors’ co-operation is crucial for 
development.    
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2 Essay 2: Topological Properties of Foreign Aid - A Social Network Perspective 
2.1 Introduction 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) is generally associated with the financial flow and 
assistance that come from the wealthier (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
OECD) countries to low income countries in the form of loans and/or grants. The last few years have seen 
a burgeoning interest in the issue of ODA especially in the context of development economics. Prominent 
research streams include the understanding about what drives ODA (donors’ motivation), how systemic 
shocks influence the amount of ODA, and evaluation of the actual impact of ODA on recipient outcomes 
(e.g., Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Dudley & Montmarquette, 1976; Fleck & Kilby, 2010; Neanidis & 
Varvarigos, 2009; Rajan & Subramanian, 2008; Svensson, 2003). Although the volume of research in 
these areas continues to increase, traditional analyses have not fully resolved these questions.  
Measurement based issues may negatively impact  the ODA research as they could compromise 
the validity of existing findings and preclude thorough evaluation of critical research questions in certain 
areas. I utilize social network theory to introduce new measures of foreign aid hoping to provide a new 
perspectives to explore these questions. Much of the extant research relies heavily on measures such as 
the aid volume and the aid/GDP ratio. These measures have been useful but they do not capture the 
underlying changes in aid patterns in terms of specific donor-recipient pairs and sub-groups. Similarly, the 
volume of foreign aid is often used as the main predictor to evaluate the growth outcomes for recipient 
countries. This could be an incomplete proxy as it fails to account for the number and relative importance 
of the donors that provide ODA to a particular recipient, which might have a significant impact on the 
growth outcomes. Such limitation also exists in the research related to aid motivation. There is growing 
acceptance that ODA is increasingly motivated by strategic (as opposed to altruistic) considerations (e.g., 
Fuchs & Nunnenkamp, 2014; Radelet, 2006). To fully understand aid motivation, several nuances of 
within-donor, within-recipient and donor-recipient competition/ strategic dynamics need to be understood.  
The social network analysis enables the focus to shift from monadic attributes of countries to 
dyadic attributes (e.g. social relations) of pairs of countries. In this paper, I draw from the literature on 
social networks (Borgatti & Everett, 1997; Jackson, 2008; Newman, 2010; Robins & Alexander, 2004) to 
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propose a set of measures that can be applied to ODA research. The system of ODA is essentially a two-
mode (bipartite) network, comprising two sets of actors (donors and recipients) whereby connections are 
only between two sets but not within. By treating ODA as a bipartite social network, I am able to examine 
foreign aid as an interdependent and sophisticated system and introduce a comprehensive set of 
network-based measures (density, degree, degree centrality, eigenvector centrality, and betweenness 
centrality) that capture the relational attributes between pairs of countries, and address various complex 
interdependencies that exist between actors.  
To my knowledge, the only prior work that applies network analysis to foreign aid is by Peterson 
(2011) which uses eigenvector centrality as proxies of donor expansiveness and recipient attractiveness. 
It is examined how being more or less attractive for aid affects the number of International Non-
Governmental Organization (INGO) in a recipient country and vice-versa. This essay hopes to show that 
the network-based measures of ODA could help examine novel foreign aid questions, and/or provide 
additional information on questions investigated previously through aid volume. The network-based 
measures could enhance our understanding of ODA by capturing more dimensions of connectivity 
between donors and recipients. Specifically, the relative position of a country in the network could be 
captured by the number of connections it has with other countries; the strength of its connections; and the 
frequency of its intermediary position connecting other countries. To illustrate the practical utility of this 
approach, I compute statistical values for each network measure using ODA data retrieved from the 
OECD website. I also provide a fuller exposition of the network based indicator in the context of the effect 
of ODA on recipients’ economic growth outcomes.  
This essay is organized as follows. Section two provides background information on ODA with 
justification for the specific selection of donors and recipients used in subsequent network analysis. 
Section three introduces an explanation of network concepts applicable to ODA. In section four, I provide 
a formal application of one network-based measure. Discussion and concluding comments will follow in 
section five. 
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2.2 Data and Stylized Facts 
Network analysis focuses on the relationships between different actors in a particular system. In 
the network terminology, actors are referred to as nodes and the connections between actors are referred 
to as links (Newman, 2010). From the perspective of foreign aid, donors and recipients represent nodes 
while links capture the flow of aid from donors to recipients. Before getting into network related details, I 
will briefly review foreign aid, explain the data source, and justify the choice of donors and recipients.  
The general idea behind foreign aid is to allow financial resources to flow from wealthier nations 
(termed donors) to less privileged ones (termed recipients) in order to help the latter with developmental 
objectives such as poverty reduction and economic growth. Given the significant role played by foreign 
aid in the global landscape, a significant amount of research has been directed at understanding aid 
evolution patterns, donors’ motivation, recipient absorptive capacity, and evaluation of the impact of aid 
on developmental outcomes (Clemens et al., 2012; Fleck & Kilby, 2010; Fuchs & Nunnenkamp, 2014; 
Rajan & Subramanian, 2008). Foreign aid related empirical research is typically conducted using data 
made available through the OECD. The OECD defines foreign aid in terms of official development 
assistance (ODA) provided by a donor to a recipient, and provides clear reporting guidelines that ensure 
uniform and accurate reporting of aid. For instance, military aid, anti-terrorism funds, and peacekeeping 
expenditures are not counted as ODA, but the donors’ costs of armed forces in delivering humanitarian 
aid are reportable (OECD, 2011). Several bilateral donors (all DAC members and several non-DAC 
donors) and various multilateral donors (such as the World Bank) report aid as ODA in accordance with 
OECD guidelines. Given its wide usage based on a consistent reporting system, OECD provided ODA 
statistics are considered a trustworthy data source for foreign aid researcher. While the OECD reports 
ODA data for all donors and recipients; in this research I use data1 for a narrower subset of donors and 
                                                          
1 The ODEC reports foreign aid (ODA) data in terms of both commitments and disbursements. Commitment 
records include the full amount of expected transfer of financial resources, whereas disbursement data is 
typically broken down as gross (the actual transfer recorded) or net (actual transfer less repayments) 
disbursements. Commitment data are favored because they better reflects donors’ aid intention and 
preferences (McGillivray & White, 1993; Tarp et al., 1999). It is also worth noting that commitment and 
disbursement measures are highly correlated (average correlation coefficient=0.955 for the period of 1965 
to 2012). 
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recipients that represent only the more important aid relationships. Next I will explain and justify the 
criteria used to select donors and recipients.  
2.2.1 Selection of Donor Nodes 
Foreign aid donors can be disaggregated as bilateral (including DAC and non-DAC members) 
and multilateral aid. Table 2.1 represents ODA commitment data over a 50-year period (1970-2010) in 
terms of 2012 US dollars (constant price) reported separately for bilateral DAC donors, bilateral non-DAC 
donors and multilateral donors.2 Data is reported both in terms of ODA commitment amount as well as the 
proportion of total aid provided by each donor class. These data show that the bilateral donors are by far 
the largest contributors3 of foreign aid, responsible for an average of 87% of the total aid for the period. It 
is also noteworthy to observe the increasing contribution of multilateral donors since 2000. 
Table 2.1  
Foreign Aid Commitment Flows (2012 USD billions, constant price) 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
DAC (bilateral) 52.218 76.404 113.064 93.473 158.141 
Non-DAC (bilateral) .. 22.926 10.843 1.398 1.955 
Multilateral 0.674 4.715 4.768 14.412 14.034 
All Donors 52.892 104.046 128.676 109.283 174.131 
While table 2.1 provides general insights into the relative importance of different donor groups, 
my interest is to identify key donor nodes. I start this process by analyzing the relative ODA contributions 
of DAC members.  Figure 2.1 presents each bilateral donor’s aid as a share of the total bilateral aid 
(averaged annually for the period 1970-2012). The pie-chart shows that over this period, the top 15 
bilateral donors account for 97% of the world’s reported total bilateral aid. As a result, I include these 15 
bilateral donors for the analysis.  
 
 
                                                          
2 Some countries such as China, Brazil, and Russia do not follow the ODA definition and do not report their 
aid numbers publically. 
3 Note that the use of the term contribution implies commitment throughout this paper. 
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Figure 2.1 Average Share of Total Bilateral Aid by Donors (1970-2012) 
In terms of multilateral donors, OECD statistics reveal two key players - The International 
Development Association (IDA) (the foreign aid arm of the World Bank) and the European Union (EU) 
Institutions (a branch of the European Union that focuses on foreign aid). On average, the IDA and EU 
Institutions respectively accounted for 33.65% and 25.64% of the total multilateral aid respectively over 
1970-2012. Figure 2.2 compares the IDA and EU Institutions with the average contributions made by 
DAC donors and confirms their influential position in the aid system. For most years, aid flows from each 
of these two biggest multilateral donors is more than the average and the median aid flows from DAC 
donors. Based on this, my final set of donor nodes totals 17 (15 DAC donors and 2 multilateral donors).  
 
Figure 2.2 Average Aid Flows from IDA and EU Institutions relative to DAC (1970-2012) 
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2.2.2 Selection of Recipient Nodes 
Having identified a donor node set, I next turn attention to explaining the criteria for including 
recipients (relative to the donor set) and specifying foreign aid links. A general feature of foreign aid is 
that while donors may give aid to several recipients, the distribution of aid is not equal. Some recipients 
receive a considerable proportion of a donor’s aid, whereas others receive an insignificant fraction. In 
order to capture those more economically significant aid relationships, I define a link in the network to be 
present only when a recipient receives an aid amount that is above a particular threshold in relation to the 
donor’s total aid. By using (
     
    
) as a threshold variable, I capture the proportion of aid received by 
recipient   from donor   as a ratio of the donor  ’s total aid budget. By using different threshold values, I 
can limit the number of recipient nodes and aid linkages. For instance, a threshold value of 0% then gives 
the full network as a link is present when a recipient gets any positive amount of aid from a donor. With a 
1% threshold value, however, a recipient will only have a link if it gets at least 1% of a donor’s total aid. 
Similar threshold approach was adopted by Kali and Reyes (2007) in identifying the economically 
important trade links in the international trade network. It is clear that raising the threshold value will lead 
to a reduction in the number of links, and the choice of threshold requires careful judgment.  
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 demonstrate the impact of different threshold values on recipient inclusion for 
bilateral (DAC members) and multilateral donors respectively. Table 2.2 shows that in general, the 
average number of recipients per DAC donor (0% threshold column) has increased from 47 recipients in 
1970 to 113 in 2012. As the threshold value is increased to 0.1%, there is a drastic reduction in the mean 
number of recipients per donor (drop from 47 to 29 in 1970, and drop from 113 to 65 in 2012). However, 
the remaining number of fewer recipients still captures the lion’s share of a donor’s total aid budget (on 
average 99%). Going to 0.5% threshold value leads to a greater reduction in the mean number of 
recipients, with the reduced set still accounting for 90% of a donor’s total aid in these years. Finally, at 1% 
threshold value, the mean number of recipients is further reduced (ranging from 14-24), while capturing 
more than 80% of a donors’ total aid in all years. Similar results are obtained for the two multilateral 
donors as well (summarized in Table 2.3). 
  
 
3
0
Table 2.2  
Mean Number of Recipients and Percentage of 15 bilateral Donor’s Budget 
Year 
Threshold 1% Threshold 0.5% Threshold 0.1% Threshold 0% 
# of 
recipients 
% of 
recipients 
% of a 
donor’s 
budget 
# of 
recipients 
% of 
recipients 
% of a 
donor’s 
budget 
# of 
recipients 
% of 
recipients 
% of a 
donor’s 
budget 
# of 
recipients 
% of a 
donor’s 
budget 
1970 14 30% 93.2 19 40% 96.6 29 62% 99.3 47 100 
1975 16 25% 89.9 21 33% 94.6 39 62% 99.3 63 100 
1980 19 23% 86.9 28 34% 93.3 50 60% 99.0 83 100 
1985 23 25% 86.1 33 35% 93.1 56 60% 98.9 93 100 
1990 21 23% 85.2 31 34% 93.0 53 59% 98.8 90 100 
1995 23 22% 83.6 35 34% 92.3 62 60% 98.95 104 100 
2000 24 22% 81.7 38 35% 91.5 66 61% 98.7 108 100 
2005 21 19% 83.5 32 29% 92.0 60 54% 98.6 111 100 
2010 24 21% 83.0 37 32% 91.9 64 55% 98.7 116 100 
2012 24 21% 81.7 38 34% 91.7 65 58% 98.7 113 100 
Table 2.3  
Mean Number of Recipients and Percentage of 2 Multilateral Donors’ Budget 
Year 
Threshold 1% Threshold 0.5% Threshold 0.1% Threshold 0% 
# of recipients 
% of a 
donor’s 
budget 
# of recipients 
% of a 
donor’s 
budget 
# of recipients 
% of a 
donor’s 
budget 
# of recipients 
% of a donor’s 
budget 
1970 22 94.9 26 98.4 31 99.9 33 100 
1975 22 89.4 32 96.7 42 99.9 55 100 
1980 24 84.4 36 93.1 57 99.4 73 100 
1985 26 85.5 38 94.1 59 99.4 78 100 
1990 28 87.3 34 91.8 63 99.2 82 100 
1995 32 79.2 49 90.98 81 99.8 100 100 
2000 26 78.4 41 89.4 76 99.2 93 100 
2005 27 79.4 45 91.3 73 99.0 101 100 
2010 26 76.4 43 88.1 82 99.1 98 100 
2012 22 78.9 38 90.2 68 98.8 95 100 
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Based on this threshold value analysis, I conclude that using up to a 1% threshold value provides 
a favorable tradeoff in terms of capturing significant aid links between donor and recipient nodes and 
ignoring minor recipients. The following thresholds are used for the aid network analysis in the next 
section.  
1) 
     
    
≥ 1%   is used for the network diagram: A link between a donor and a recipient is present 
only if a recipient gets at least 1% of a donor’s total aid budget.  
2) 
     
    
≥ 0.5%   is used for network-based measures: A link between a donor and a recipient is 
present only if a recipient gets at least 0.5% of a donor’s total aid budget. 
2.3 A Network Approach to Analyze Foreign Aid 
This section demonstrates how network analysis can be used to better understand and explain 
foreign aid relationships. First, I provide some background information on salient network concepts and 
then develop several network based measures. Next, I discuss how the specific network measures are 
value added tools that can be used to better understand foreign aid such as the evolution of the aid 
system, changes in donors’ motivation, the overall aid distribution patterns, and response to events such 
as the demise of the Soviet Union and the 9/11 terror attack.  
2.3.1 Aid Network Overview 
My first step in understanding the topological properties of the aid network is to examine its 
structure i.e. the nodes and links in the network. There are different types of network structures based on 
the number of underlying characteristic that holds nodes together (termed mode). A one-mode network 
involves linkages between a single set of actors. A typical example of such a network structure is 
international trade, where all countries (actors) are viewed as part of a single set (one world-system of 
trade), and linkages are created when trade relations exist. Another type of network structure is referred 
to as two-mode network, affiliation network, or bipartite network. This type of structure involves two 
different sets of actors; with linkages only existing between the actors across sets but not within. It is 
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notable that the lack of ties within sets is by design, not happenstance (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011). Foreign 
aid falls under the two-mode network category (see Figure 2.3) as it involves two different sets of actors 
(donors, set U and recipients, set V) 4. More importantly, linkages are only possible between actors across 
these the two sets. No linkages exist within U and V.  
 
Figure 2.3 Two-mode Structure  
One approach in dealing with two-mode data is to transform them into two one-mode data on 
which the standard network analysis could be applied. Latapy et al. (2008) suggest applying a projection 
such that two nodes in the same set are considered to have a link only if they have a common neighbor in 
the network. However, it is not always clear how to interpret this transformed connection between actors 
within the same set and there could also be a loss of information. Borgatti and Everett (1997) look at data 
in Gardner et al. (1941) which records women attending a series of social events. They point out that two 
pairs of women could have the same degree of overlap but through entirely different events, but the 
transformed one-mode data fail to provide such information. Faust (1997) also states that the relationship 
between the centrality of one set of actors and the centrality of the other set of actors cannot be studied 
just by looking at the transformed one-mode data separately. An alternative approach is to leave the two-
mode matrix as it is and use new techniques to analyze them. In this paper, I follow the methodology 
established in Borgatti and Everett (1997) to work with a two-mode matrix directly. 
                                                          
4 There are a few countries which were aid recipients and currently are aid donors. But these transition 
countries enter only the recipient set of nodes under the threshold being used. As an example, South Korea 
was a recipient before 2000, so it was in the recipient set. When it became an aid donor, it only contributed 
0.31% of the total bilateral aid on average and was not included in the network using any threshold.    
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The data used for foreign aid network were extracted from OECD Aid Statistics for the period 
1970 to 2012. Again countries are the nodes of the network and links between them represent aid 
relations among these countries. I organize the data in matrix form as 2-mode structure, letting columns 
denote aid donors and rows denote aid recipients. Suppose the sizes of the donor set and recipient set 
are    and    respectively. I use a    ∗   binary matrix where     = 1 if a link between donor   and recipient   
is present at a certain threshold and     = 0 otherwise. As an illustration, Table 2.4 is the 2-mode binary 
matrix for the 17 donors and the first 5 recipients in the sample when 0.5% threshold is used for 2012. For 
example,     = 1 denotes that there is a link between Albania and Germany and Albania gets more than 
0.5% of Germany’s total aid budget in 2012.     
A useful feature of network analysis is the generation of topological maps from which useful 
insights regarding nodes and links can be gleaned. Figure 2.4 is an ODA network diagram for 2012. 
Round and square symbols on the map represent donor and recipient nodes respectively, and connecting 
lines represent aid links. Sizes of symbols are direct representations of the volume of aid 
donated/received. Hence, large round symbols represent major donors and large square symbols 
represent major recipients. The position of nodes on the map provides insights regarding aid 
relationships. For example, recipients and donors with aid relationships are placed closer to each other 
on the map. Furthermore, donors that share common recipients are placed closer to each other as are 
recipients that receive aid from a common donor. 
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Table 2.4  
Partial Binary Matrix for 0.5% Threshold in 2012 
 Aid Donors 
 AUS BEL CAN DNK FRA GER ITA JPN NLD NOR ESP SWE CHE UK US EUI IDA 
Aid Recipients                  
Albania 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Belarus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Croatia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cyprus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Figure 2.3 Two-mode Structure  
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The next step is to develop some network based measures and use them in combination with 
visual diagrams to provide useful information regarding the global aid system. Here, I discuss five such 
network indicators and explain how they apply to the foreign aid context. The first two measures - density 
and clustering - are usually applied to describe the overall aid network. The remaining three measures – 
degree centrality, eigenvector centrality, and betweenness centrality - are used to evaluate the relative 
influence a country has in the aid system.  
2.3.2 Density  
Network density is a good measure of how integrated a system is as a whole. It is defined as the 
number of present links in a network as a proportion of maximum possible number of links in a network 
(Borgatti & Everett, 1997). For two-mode data, the maximum number of  links  possible occurs  when  
every  node  in  one  set  is  connected  to  every  node in  the  other set. Thus the foreign aid network 
density is expressed in the following function:  
∆ =
 
    
   
where   and   represent nodes from donor and recipient sets respectively;   is the total number of 
aid links;    and     are the size of the two sets respectively. This measure can be used to evaluate the 
evolution of aid linkages over time. As an example, I compare the foreign aid density over time. Figures 
2.5 and 2.6 represent foreign aid network for 1970 and 1995 respectively.  
    
 
 
3
7
 
Figure 2.5 ODA Network for 1970 
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Figure 2.6 ODA Network for 1995 
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Armenia
AUS
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh
BEL
Benin
Bolivia
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Burkina,Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
CAN
Central,African,Rep.
Chad
CHE
Chile
China
Colombia
Congo,,Dem.,Rep.
Costa,Rica
Cote,d'Ivoire
DNK
Dominican,Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El,Salvador
Eritrea
ESP
Ethiopia
EU
Fiji
Former,Yugoslav,Republic,of,Macedonia
FRA
French,Polynesia
Gabon
Georgia
GER
Ghana
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Haiti
Honduras
IDA
IndiaIndonesia
Iran
Iraq
Israel
ITA
Jamaica
Jordan
JPN
Kenya
Kyrgyz,Republic
Laos
Lebanon
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Mayotte
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Namibia
Nepal
New,Caledonia
Nicaragua
Niger
NLD
NOR
Pakistan
Palau
Papua,New,Guinea
Peru
Philippines
Rwanda
Samoa
Senegal
Serbia
Sierra,Leone
Slovenia
Somalia
South,Africa
Sri,Lanka
States,Ex-Yugoslavia
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
SWE
Syria
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
UK
US
Vietnam
West,Bank,&,Gaza,Strip
West,Indies,,regional
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe
    
39 
 
A chronological glance at aid diagrams (viewing aid diagrams in order of 2.5, 2.6 and 2.4) reveals 
an increased crowding i.e., the network maps appear denser over time. The density measure allows for 
quantitative capture of increased crowding (Table 2.5).  
Table 2.5   
Aid Network Density over Time 
 1970 1995 2012 
Network Density 0.104 0.199 0.206 
A follow up network mapping and analysis can be used to decipher the evolution of increased 
density. For example, Figure 2.7 is a network diagram that represents the changes in the aid network 
between 1970 and 1995.  
 
Figure 2.7 Increased Number of Aid Relationships by 1995 
Links shown in Figure 2.7 represent only the newly established aid relations (the relationship 
existed in 1995 but not in 1970). The donor community is positioned in the center (yellow color nodes) 
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whereas the recipients are located at the corners and grouped according to geographic continents -- 
America, Europe, Africa, Asia, and Oceania. In addition, map also separates recipients in terms of 
whether they are entirely new to the aid network (i.e., they previously never received aid from any donor) 
or whether they received aid from some donors in 1970 (existing recipients). Entirely new recipients (e.g., 
Samoa) are captured through red dots, whereas existing recipients with new linkages are captured 
through blue dots (e.g., Fiji). An analysis of Figure 2.7 shows that a total of 240 new foreign aid links were 
created between 1970 and 1995 and that these new linkages comprised both new and existing recipients. 
Furthermore, the geographical grouping shows that certain continents such as Africa and Asia had a 
larger proportion of new links (43.75% and 33.75%) as opposed to America, Europe and Oceania 
(16.25%, 5%, and 1.25% respectively). 
Network density measures can also provide different information regarding foreign aid evolution 
as compared to aid volume numbers. Data computed over an extended period of time shows a consistent 
rise in the foreign aid network density over time across different thresholds (see Table 2.6). The network 
density drops as the threshold value increases indicating that smaller number of aid relations are formed 
at higher level of aid. In addition, the returned values of density over time enable the observation of the 
evolution of the aid network. For the period 1970-2012, the density increased in general at all thresholds, 
but by a smaller margin with higher threshold values. Network density increased by 125% at the 0.1% 
threshold, by 98% at the 0.5% threshold, and by 61% at the 1% threshold. The implication is that aid 
relations increased much more at the lower levels of aid. 
Table 2.6   
Aid Network Density 
Threshold 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2012 
1% (donor budget) 0.081 0.085 0.098 0.117 0.116 0.13 0.135 0.119 0.136 0.131 
0.5% (donor budget) 0.104 0.121 0.146 0.169 0.169 0.199 0.21 0.186 0.205 0.206 
0.1% (donor budget) 0.158 0.211 0.26 0.285 0.291 0.348 0.368 0.333 0.362 0.357 
Over the same time period, however, the volume of foreign aid does not have a similar pattern. 
Figure 2.8 compares aid volumes (in constant dollars) with the density of the aid system at a 0.5% 
threshold over time. Before 1990, both aid volume and density increased implying the establishment of 
new aid relations with increased flow of ODA. However, paying attention to certain time periods 
    
41 
 
representing unexpected shocks to the system (e.g., end of cold war), I find different foreign aid patterns 
in terms of aid volume and network density. First, in the post-Cold War era (early 1990s) there was a 
sharp decrease in aid volumes but an increase in the network density. This tends to suggest that more 
new aid relations were established in this period even though total amount of financial resources provided 
was actually being reduced. One potential explanation could be that the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
allowed the DAC donors to establish relationships with those newly independent nations and ease their 
transition towards a market economy. A second shock worth investigating is the 9/11 terror attack. At this 
time, it is observed that the volume of aid started to increase again suggesting that donors began to use 
aid as a tool of diplomacy. However, network density started to fall during this period so that aid was 
concentrated towards those strategically important recipients. Thus, network density measure, by 
emphasizing the relational aspects of foreign aid, provides different and useful information as compared 
to the total aid volume. 
 
Figure 2.8 Aid Volumes and Network Density 
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Some network measures advance understanding of the topological relationships by focusing 
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node degree, which records the number of links connected to a given node. The formula for node degree 
is:   
  (  ) = ∑    
  
   
 
where     is the link between donor   and recipient  , and    is the size of the opposite set. In the 
aid context, the degree of a donor is determined by the number of recipients it reaches, and the degree of 
a recipient is determined by the number of donors it gets aid from.  
Node degree reflects each country’s involvement in the aid system and helps identify main 
donors and recipients as a function of their connections. Figures 2.9 and 2.10 show the degree 
distribution from both donors’ and recipients’ perspectives at the 0.5% threshold. It seems that the degree 
distribution from the recipient side follows the power-law where the number of nodes with degree   
follows an exponential distribution, or mathematically  ( ) ≈    . This finding reflects the existence of a 
Pareto distribution and implies that a large fraction of recipients have ties with a few donors while only a 
handful of recipients have ties with a large number of donors. 
 
Figure 2.9 Recipients’ degree distribution in 1970 and 2010 
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30-50 in the post-Cold War era, and returned to 20-40 by 2005 after the 9/11 terror attack. This finding is 
consistent with the change of network density in Figure 2.8.  
2.3.4 Degree Centrality 
Degree centrality identifies the power and influence a given node has in the system with respect 
to other nodes. This measure is computed through the following formula:   
   (  ) =
 (  )
  
 
The node centrality enables the identification of the presence of a center of gravity for the 
network. In the aid context, a country with higher degree centrality is more central in the system. Figure 
2.10 summarizes the node centrality for both donors and recipients over time at the 0.5% threshold. The 
transparent bars show the range of scores and blue bars show the mean with standard deviation. The 
country that has the highest score is labeled on the upper bound of the score range. The results suggest 
France, Germany, and EU institutions are the most central donors in general with Switzerland becoming 
the most central donor in 2012; Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kenya, Mozambique, China, India, Indonesia, Iraq, 
Afghanistan are the most central recipient at different times. 
 
Figure 2.10 Descriptive Statistics for Node Centrality 
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2.3.5 Eigenvector Centrality 
A limitation of degree centrality is that it fails to differentiate nodes which have the same number 
of links. For instance, it’s hard to compare Afghanistan with Pakistan in 2010 as they both return the 
same value of 1 based on degree centrality in Figure 2.10. One way to overcome this is by looking at 
eigenvector centrality of the node. This is defined as the principal eigenvector of the adjacency matrix and 
can be obtained by computing the eigenvectors of XX' and X'X, where X is the raw two-mode incidence 
matrix. It may be thought of as a weighted degree measure in which the centrality of a node is 
proportional to the centrality of all the nodes connected to it (Borgatti & Everett, 1997). I use the UCINET 
program (Borgatti et al., 1990) which normalizes eigenvector centrality by the maximum attainable score 
(i.e. square root of one half). 
In the foreign aid context, eigenvector centrality of a recipient takes into account not only its own 
degree but also the degree of its donors. So fewer countries have the same eigenvector score. A 
recipient country is more central if it gets aid from donors who support many other recipients. This can to 
some extent differentiate recipients by the strength of their connections assuming that connections to a 
central donor indicate more than a peripheral donor. Table 2.7 reports the top recipients with high 
eigenvector centrality at 0.5% threshold.    
Table 2.7  
Recipients’ rankings by different measures of aid 
Country by Amount by Degree by Eigenvector Centrality by Betweenness 
India 1 10 not-top-10 8 
Afghanistan 2 1 1 1 
Pakistan 3 1 2 2 
Vietnam 4 5 7 4 
Haiti 5 3 3 3 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 6 10 not-top-10 not top-10 
Kenya 7 8 8 not top-10 
Ethiopia 8 5 5 7 
Tanzania 9 10 10 not top-10 
Indonesia 10 10 not-top-10 9 
Mozambique not-top-10 3 4 5 
West Bank & Gaza 
Strip 
not-top-10 5 6 6 
Sudan not-top-10 8 9 10 
    
45 
 
2.3.6 Betweenness Centrality 
Betweenness is usually measured as the number of geodesic paths that pass through a given 
node, expressed as a proportion of maximum possible number of equivalent paths between the same two 
nodes including those which do not pass through the given node. It is notable that the chief criteria for 
betweenness centrality is not the number of links a node has but whether a node is able to create a 
critical link between two nodes that otherwise would not be linked. Following Borgatti and Everett (1997), 
the denominator is given by  
  
2(   − 1)(   − 1) ,                                                                       >   
 
 
  (   − 1) +
 
 
(   − 1)(   − 2) + (   − 1)(   − 1),      ≤    
 
where    is the size of a node’s own set and    is the size of the opposite set. In the context of 
foreign aid, a recipient is more central if it creates ties between donors, and similarly a donor is more 
central if it creates ties between recipients. For example, a donor with higher betweenness score 
indicates that this particular donor is found more frequently in an intermediary position along the geodesic 
paths linking other recipients. Therefore, the information of one recipient’s aid experience or effectiveness 
can be passed to another through these central donors. Betweenness centrality can also serve as a 
useful proxy for a country's ability to serve as a mediator between groups of countries. For example the 
United Sates has been able to reduce tensions between Egypt and Israel and allowed them to come to 
security agreements. So a donor with high betweeness centrality is more capable of getting disparate 
recipients closer and to work towards common goal or objective.  
In general, using betweenness centrality the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and EU 
institutions are the most central donors and Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kenya, Mozambique, China, India, 
Iraq, Afghanistan are the most central recipient (Table 2.7). Table 2.7 presents the changes in recipients’ 
rankings by aid amount, degree, eigenvector centrality, and betweenness centrality. While the degree, 
eigenvector, and betweenness centrality measures are correlated, they have different emphasis in the aid 
network prominence. 
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2.4 Application: Recipients’ Aid Connectivity and Growth 
In this section, I provide an in-depth application example of one particular network based 
measure -- recipient degree centrality -- as a foreign-aid based predictor of economic growth.  
2.4.1 Aid and Growth: Empirical Model 
Literature considers a country’s per capita income growth as a function of the volume of aid 
controlling for initial income, policy, institutional quality, and geographic location, and find mixed results 
exploring the effect of aid on growth (Boone, 1996; Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Clemens et al., 2012; Rajan 
& Subramanian, 2008). I propose that in addition to the overall amount of resources (aid volume), the 
recipient’s connectivity in the aid system (such as degree centrality) may also have an impact on their 
growth rate.  
In order to evaluate the influence of the recipients’ aid connectivity on economic growth, I revisit a 
prominent study conducted by Rajan and Subramanian (2008) and follow the model specification and 
estimation strategy using extended data for the period 1970-2005 from Clemens et al (2014). The 
following equation is estimated for recipient   at period  . 
     ℎ    =    +   (   /   )   +        +            +        +          +          +         +
  ( 2/   )   +        +            +      ℎ      +              
where      ℎ  is the five-year average annual growth of per capita GDP,    /    is aid to GDP 
(a normalized measure of aid volume),    is the initial level of per capita GDP,        is the initial level of 
trade policy index,    is the initial level of life expectancy,      is geography (the average of number of 
frost days and tropical land area),      is institutional quality,     is the initial inflation,  2/    is the 
initial financial depth,    is the budget balance as proportion of GDP,       is the average number of 
revolution, and   ℎ    is the ethnic fractionalization.  
The recipient degree centrality is then added to the above equation (resulting in the new equation 
shown below) and test the null hypothesis that highly connected recipients in the aid network does not 
accelerate their own economic growth. 
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     ℎ    =    +   (   /   )   +          +        +            +        +          +          +
        +   ( 2/   )   +         +            +      ℎ      +              
where        is the network measure capturing the five-year average connectivity of recipient  .  
2.4.2 OLS Results 
A general relationship is tested in OLS regression for periods 1970-1980, 1980-1990, and 1990-
2000. Table 2.8 juxtaposes original aid/GDP estimates (columns 1, 3, and 5) with recipient degree 
centrality estimates (columns 2, 4, and 6) using. The original model specification shows that there is a 
positive relationship between the aid volume and the growth for the 1970 decade but a reverse (negative) 
relationship for the 1980 and 1990 decades. Furthermore, the estimated aid coefficient is significant only 
in for one time period (1980-1990) where a 1 percentage point increase in aid/GDP is associated with 
0.18 percent point decrease in the average annual growth of GDP.  
When the degree centrality is added to the model, there is a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between recipients’ initial degree centrality and their growth in 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, 
the positive effect of higher degree centrality on the average annual growth of GDP is quite striking. 
Columns 5 and 8 report that a one percentage-point increase in the degree centrality increases the 
average annual growth rate of per capita GDP by 2.40 and 3.52 percentage points respectively in 1980s 
and 1990s. 
Due to the non-random assignment of foreign aid, however, these estimates are subject to 
endogeneity concerns. Indeed, it is possible that there is potential simultaneous causation between 
growth and foreign aid. Lower growth rate at period   − 1 could result in a recipient receiving higher 
amount of aid at the beginning of period   resulting in higher growth rate measured at end of period  . 
This problem is well understood in the literature and a possible solution is the use of Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM).  
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Table 2.8   
Impact of Aid Volume and Connectivity on Growth: OLS Estimation 
 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
aid/gdp 0.049 0.011 -0.182*** -0.173*** -0.003 0.103 
 (0.080) (0.088) (0.057) (0.056) (0.094) (0.076) 
initial degc  -2.530  2.399**  3.524*** 
  (2.016)  (1.112)  (1.026) 
yc -1.684** -1.891** -2.592*** -1.658*** -1.138* -0.152 
 (0.744) (0.791) (0.606) (0.571) (0.591) (0.594) 
policy 1.734* 2.259* 2.095** 1.887* -0.164 -0.444 
 (0.958) (1.179) (1.022) (0.962) (0.566) (0.502) 
le 0.081 0.059 0.090 0.069 0.153** 0.172*** 
 (0.071) (0.075) (0.065) (0.060) (0.065) (0.047) 
geog -0.011 0.199 0.462 0.389 0.693* 1.091*** 
 (0.470) (0.599) (0.328) (0.280) (0.409) (0.321) 
inst 9.796** 10.43** 6.924** 6.931** 2.963 2.806 
 (3.988) (3.983) (2.867) (3.031) (3.159) (2.571) 
Inf -0.005 -0.006 -0.002 -0.006 -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
M2/GDP -0.009 -0.020 -0.008 -0.014 -0.004 -0.016 
 (0.038) (0.041) (0.027) (0.025) (0.015) (0.014) 
bb 0.035 0.031 0.013 -0.015 0.204*** 0.207*** 
 (0.060) (0.055) (0.046) (0.042) (0.059) (0.054) 
revol -0.665 -0.979 -0.940 -0.716 -0.499 -0.849 
 (1.011) (1.341) (0.710) (0.836) (0.656) (0.545) 
ethfrac 0.958 1.423 -0.0489 -0.524 1.756 1.583* 
 (1.419) (1.506) (1.037) (1.030) (1.104) (0.921) 
safrica -1.668 -2.077* -0.213 0.398 -0.601 -0.600 
 (1.145) (1.179) (0.864) (0.908) (1.104) (1.104) 
east -0.660 -0.906 0.718 0.976 0.898 0.790 
 (1.161) (1.250) (0.807) (0.784) (0.715) (0.626) 
Constant 5.914 9.317* 13.56*** 6.768 -0.182 -9.720* 
 (4.390) (5.294) (3.634) (4.320) (4.803) (4.862) 
Observations 74 71 74 68 69 63 
R-squared 0.381 0.393 0.594 0.644 0.618 0.731 
*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01. 
2.4.3 GMM Results 
GMM estimations are employed to address the potential endogeneity of all the regressors and 
incorporate fixed effects. Identification relies on first-differencing and using lagged values of the 
endogenous variables as instruments. In the difference-GMM estimator (or the Arellano and Bond 
procedure), lagged levels are used as instrument for the differenced right-hand-side variables. Table 2.9 
reports the results across different specifications.  
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Table 2.9 GMM Regressions (Arellano-Bond Procedure) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
aid/gdp -0.105 -0.177* 0.135 
 (0.105) (0.103) (0.154) 
degc  6.831** 8.012* 
  (3.311) (4.673) 
degc*aid   -0.716** 
   (0.321) 
yc_penn -2.654* -1.937 -2.041 
 (1.564) (1.953) (2.071) 
le_wdi -0.128 -0.119 -0.0846 
 (0.135) (0.156) (0.179) 
sw1_i 0.440 0.314 0.223 
 (0.934) (0.719) (0.798) 
INST_QLTY -1.137 -1.335 0.0640 
 (2.994) (3.054) (2.756) 
lninfl -1.360** -0.810 -0.849* 
 (0.635) (0.572) (0.439) 
m2final -6.563 -6.205 -7.300** 
 (4.670) (4.861) (3.315) 
bbfinal 12.04 8.218 18.46* 
 (9.219) (9.662) (9.898) 
revolutions -2.674*** -2.185*** -2.271*** 
 (0.765) (0.627) (0.797) 
tdum3  -2.348**  
  (0.969)  
tdum4 1.726** -0.707 1.337* 
 (0.697) (0.662) (0.700) 
tdum5 2.303** -0.124 1.976** 
 (1.022) (0.426) (0.796) 
tdum6 2.540***  2.029*** 
 (0.980)  (0.751) 
Endogenous variables used 
as instruments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exogenous variable used as 
instrument 
Initial income, aid, 
policy, inst. quality, 
inflation, M2,  
budget balance, 
revolutions,  
life expectancy 
 
 
Ethnic  
Geography 
Initial income, aid, 
degree centrality, 
policy, 
inst. quality, inflation, 
M2,  
budget balance, 
revolutions, life 
expectancy 
Ethnic  
Geography 
Initial income, aid, 
degree centrality, 
policy, 
inst. quality, 
inflation, M2, 
budget balance, 
revolutions, life 
expectancy 
Ethnic  
Geography 
*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01. 
Column 1 reports the core specification of the Rajan and Subramanian (2008) and it fails to find a 
significant aid-growth relationship. In column 2, the centrality-growth evidence is tested controlling the 
aid/gdp ratio by adding the degree centrality term to the core specification. The result is quite interesting. 
There is some evidence (at 10% level) that a 1 percentage point increase in aid/GDP is associated with 
0.18 percent point decrease in average annual growth of GDP. However, a one percentage-point increase 
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in degree centrality increases the average annual growth rate of per capita GDP by 6.8 percentage points 
(at 5% level). Column 3 adds the interaction of centrality and aid/gdp into the specification. We did not find 
evidence that aid connectivity works better with larger amounts of aid. 
2.4.4 Discussion 
A positive relationship was found between the recipients’ degree centrality and their economic 
growth. The next step is to explain why a highly connected recipient in the aid system has better 
economic performance. One possible explanation is diversification. For aid to generate an impact on the 
overall growth several sectors may need simultaneous attention. Recipients with high degree centrality 
are likely to have a wider set of donors whose expertise and interests span across various sectors such 
as infrastructure, health, transportation, education, and banking financial services, allowing for joint 
progress in multiple areas. Second, donors are vested parties in the foreign aid system and they are likely 
to take an active role in understanding how to better optimize their disbursements. One way that donors 
gather information is through discussion with other donors, whereby they communicate their aid related 
experiences with each other. Such exchanges result in greater positive externalities for highly connected 
recipients as there are multiple donors who have information on such recipients. On the other hand, high 
degree centrality for recipients may motivate them to retain their favorable position in the network. 
Accordingly, such recipients might put more effort in promoting democracy, developing better 
governance, controlling for corruption etc., which has the desirable side effect of a favorable climate being 
created to convert aid into actual growth. 
I am going to provide some evidence from the donors’ perspectives. A higher number of donors 
could provide aid for more sectors. OECD/DAC Aid Statistics disaggregate ODA into 8 broad sectors: 
social infrastructure & services, economic infrastructure & services, production sectors, multisector/cross-
cutting, commodity aid/general program assistance, action relating to debt, humanitarian aid, unallocated 
aid. I first check the number of sectors each donor contributes to. Table 2.10 shows each donor’s average 
coverage in a five-year duration from 1971 to 2005. The evolution shows that donors reach more sectors 
over time and by 2005 all donors cover all sectors in general. The larger sector coverage along with the 
smaller variation among donors could imply that they do not utilize different expertise or cooperate with 
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each other. It is notable that there is a dramatic increase for multilateral donors (EU institution and World 
Bank) in the new millennium.  
Table 2.10  
Mean Number of Sectors 
 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-2000 2001-05 
AUS 5 5 5 5 5.8 8 8 
BEL 5.4 5 5.2 5.4 6.4 8 8 
CAN 5.2 5.2 5.6 5.4 6.2 8 7.8 
DNK 4 5 4 4.4 5.2 6.6 7.6 
FRA 6 5.6 5.8 6 6 7.2 7.8 
GER 6 6 6 6 6 8 8 
ITA 3.2 4.6 5.8 6 6.4 8 8 
JPN 6 6 6 6 6.4 8 8 
NLD 5.8 6 6 6 6.2 7.8 7.8 
NOR 4.6 4.6 4.8 5 6.2 7.8 8 
ESP     6 8 8 
SWE 5 5.6 5 5.2 6.2 8 8 
CHE 4.6 5.6 4.8 5.2 6.2 6.4 7.8 
UK 5.2 6 6 6 6.2 7.8 8 
US 5.2 5.4 5.4 6 5.8 7.6 8 
EU   2.8 2 1.4 1.4 7.2 
IDA   2.2 3.6 3.4 1.2 5.8 
Although donors tend to reach all sectors, this does not necessary mean that they distribute aid 
equally to each sector. Priority may be given only to a few specific sectors. The standard deviation of aid 
across 8 sectors for each donor is reported in Table 2.11. A larger variation suggests the uniformly 
distribution across sectors or the concentration of aid in a few sectors. In general, Japan, France, the 
United States, Germany, and the World Bank concentrate on a few sectors while Switzerland, Denmark 
and Sweden distribute aid more evenly to all sectors.     
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Table 2.11  
Standard Deviation of Sectorial Aid by Donors 
 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-2000 2001-05 
AUS 219.8312 63.62537 134.6147 178.0915 299.0531 282.9375 313.3018 
BEL 317.8817 392.8004 151.1513 131.6177 81.82261 86.78602 194.9005 
CAN 259.4989 205.5482 307.2197 291.6913 311.3715 279.8118 459.8277 
DNK 67.4274 101.2733 116.0428 133.5514 190.8856 194.6834 243.3441 
FRA 1706.317 1933.239 2128.255 1596.722 1109.995 1090.397 1164.058 
GER 533.5482 641.3945 962.3649 915.1682 753.734 760.5669 961.0659 
ITA 232.9508 35.65795 293.012 546.3988 340.9283 107.8246 286.3699 
JPN 729.5164 1095.555 1471.307 1754.37 2366.686 2168.405 2094.463 
 
Table 2.11  
Standard Deviation of Sectorial Aid by Donors (Cont.) 
 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-2000 2001-05 
NLD 231.9554 414.3599 292.4818 357.5189 322.0508 407.6791 645.0789 
NOR 73.44167 111.553 148.8919 160.4541 157.6094 240.8385 401.0973 
ESP     213.45 189.8336 277.851 
SWE 168.2013 224.8996 160.0577 176.422 208.4193 190.3205 291.0229 
CHE 35.14334 71.06332 88.95475 97.62205 118.6218 84.24901 121.1389 
UK 559.65 401.1402 247.2774 276.8866 254.4709 242.7294 706.0709 
US 2914.161 2094.676 1195.228 2200.004 1360.524 1071.275 2853.905 
EU   467.6546 781.8548 268.2892 838.3432 1203.642 
IDA   1179.649 939.5867 1419.879 2133.714 2375.688 
2.5 Conclusion  
Treating foreign aid as a bipartite social network allows to evaluate it as a complex and 
interdependent system. I showed how a network diagram of foreign aid is an effective visual tool that 
helps account for properties of individual actors (e.g., size of donors and recipients) and also relational 
attributes between actors (links between donors and recipients). In addition to this, I demonstrated how 
observing differences in topological properties across network diagrams constructed for different time 
periods could provide a rich understanding of aid evolution patterns. 
My main endeavor in this essay involved developing a set of network measures for foreign aid. 
The network based measures could be helpful in addressing different aspects of the intricate foreign aid 
picture. Some measures (e.g., density, degree distribution) are particularly useful in describing the overall 
network properties of the foreign aid system. Other measures (e.g., degree centrality, betweenness 
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centrality, and eigenvector centrality) are more node specific, thereby allowing the understanding of 
various complex considerations that determine the position of a particular donor and/or recipient in the 
network. Illustrating the usefulness of the network based measure, I follow a prominent study in this area 
conducted by Rajan and Subramanian (2008) and add recipients’ connectivity (degree centrality) as an 
explanatory variable in the model. I find evidence of a positive and significant relationship between the 
recipients’ connectivity in the aid system and their economic growth. This finding helps explain the effect 
of aid on economic growth from a different perspective. Maybe the amount of aid itself does not greatly 
promote growth. Instead, getting aid from a couple of donors with smaller amount from each donor 
returned better effect. I tried to explore how recipients’ aid connectivity may help with their economic 
growth from the perspectives of both donors and recipients. Some potential explanations include 
diversification, complementary, and maintaining attractiveness.  
Since this paper represents a preliminary exploratory effort in importing network concepts for 
foreign aid research usage, it has certain limitations that provide avenues for future research. In the 
development of measures, I did not account for differences in the weightage of links. While I used a 
threshold approach, each link included was given equal weight. A valuable avenue for future research is 
to use weighted measures for links (Fagiolo et al., 2010). This will allow for network measures to offer 
even greater sophistication in capturing relational attributes of links. Similarly, more network based 
indicators of foreign aid could be developed in the future work. In addition, numerous avenues are 
therefore available for future researchers to apply network measures for empirical investigation. I 
recommend keeping an open mind and encourage creativity in the use of network measures, with the 
choice dictated by the specifics of each investigation. When necessary, network measures can be used in 
a complementary fashion alongside traditional measures (as demonstrated by the application example). 
In other cases, however, a network measure might provide greater value addition as a substitute for a 
traditional measure.  
I hope that this paper gets the conversation started in terms of how network methodology and 
related measures can help better understand foreign aid research. While prior research acknowledges 
the complexities associated with foreign aid measures, these are presented as a set of problems/ 
limitations one has to live with. The differentiating feature of the network based approach is that it 
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acknowledges measurement problems with the agenda of providing solutions. While I offer several 
network related insights to address foreign aid issues, I view this paper as nothing more than a “first step” 
in this general direction. I remain optimistic that future research will further the knowledge base in this 
area by providing necessary refinements and extensions to this preliminary endeavor.  
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3 Essay 3: When Aid Recipients Turned into Donors - Cases of South Korea and 
Turkey 
3.1 Introduction  
Through decades of research, foreign aid literature attempts to understand a fundamental 
question - what drives aid. Foreign aid is designed to help poverty alleviation and thus has an altruistic 
side, but motivations of aid are far more complex. Donors’ motivations has been tested from mainly two 
perspectives – the recipient need model and the donor interest model. McKinlay and Little (1977, 1978a, 
1978b, 1979) looks at both models and find that the donor interest model performed better for the United 
States, France, and the United Kingdom. Maizels and Nissanke (1984) studies bilateral donors and 
multilateral donors separately and find that bilateral donors are driven more by their own interests such as 
political/security and trade benefits while multilateral donors are driven more by the needs of recipient 
countries. Hybrid models are adopted later to consider the balance of recipients’ needs and donors’ 
interests (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Cassen, 1994; Meernik, Krueger, & Poe, 1998; McGillivray & 
Oczkowski, 1991; Poe & Sirirangsi, 1993). Their findings generally confirm that historical connections, 
commercial ties, and strategic interests are significant determinants of aid allocation rather than the 
recipient countries’ economic needs and performance.  
Although foreign aid data has been long compiled by the DAC for OECD counties, rich OECD 
countries do not represent the entire donor community. Global development cooperation has been 
changing as more emerging economies start to help other developing countries. During the first decade of 
the 21st century, the number of the emerging economies that provided foreign assistance increased to 
more than 30 (Paulo & Reisen, 2010). Examples include countries such as China, India, Brazil, Thailand, 
and Indonesia. These donors are called emerging donors or new donors in the literature. Woods (2008) 
describes this fact as “a silent revolution” in the international development cooperation. Scholars have 
been trying to study the motivations of these emerging donors. However, several traits of this new type of 
foreign assistance create obstacles to further such research. For example, emerging donors may not 
follow the same definition of ODA that is commonly used by DAC and they suffer from the critiques of 
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data credibility and transparency (Chanana, 2009; Kragelund, 2008; McCormick, 2008; Paulo & Reisen, 
2010).  
In this essay I focus on two specific new donor countries: South Korea and Turkey. They follow 
the OECD/DAC definition of foreign aid as well as the comprehensive statistical reporting system. 
Moreover, unlike general emerging donors which are still aid recipients, South Korea has completed its 
transition from an aid recipient to a net donor. Along the line of donors’ motivations, I will explore whether 
strategic considerations carry less weight when determining aid allocation for these two nations. One 
specific question is whether their past experience as aid recipients has any impact on their new roles as 
donors. Having achieved rapid economic development while receiving foreign assistance, South Korea 
and Turkey should be clear on what helped them the most and therefore may have a different 
understanding on how to make aid more effective for the recipients. This essay analyzes their aid 
allocation patterns assuming these patterns could reflect donors’ motivations and goals of their foreign 
assistance. South Korea is also compared with its neighboring country, and predecessor, Japan. 
Similarity in their aid distribution by recipients’ geographic regions and income groups could provide 
evidence on whether South Korea mirrored Japan’s foreign aid policy.   
This essay is organized as follows. Section 2 describes South Korea and Turkey’s transition from 
aid recipients to donors. Section three analyzes their aid allocation by recipients’ geographic regions and 
income groups with the focus on the evolution of aid allocation patterns and the similarity between South 
Korea and Japan. Concluding comments follow in section four.    
3.2 Transitions from Aid Recipients to Donors  
This section uses data from OECD/DAC Aid Statistics to illustrate South Korea and Turkey’s 
foreign assistance both as aid recipients and as donors.  
3.2.1 South Korea’s Transition  
Figure 3.1 plots South Korea’s net ODA flows for the period 1960-2014 in constant prices. The 
solid line shows the net inflow of aid from 1960 to 1999 and represents South Korea as a recipient. The 
dashed line shows its net outflow of aid since 1987 and represents South Korea as a donor. In late 1980s, 
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South Korea started to provide aid although it was still a recipient country. By 1992, its total net 
disbursement as a donor was about $103 million dollars while it received -14.7 million dollars from DAC 
and non-DAC donors as a recipient. The negative inflows of aid in the 1990s imply that its repayment of 
previous concessional loans exceeded the amount of aid it received. South Korea completely stopped 
receiving aid in 2000, and its net aid disbursement as a donor reached 1.7 billion US dollars.   
 
Figure 3.1 South Korea's Net Aid Flows (constant price: USD millions) 
South Korea submitted its application to join DAC in 2008. The DAC then conducted a special 
review of South Korea’s international development co-operation and provided sets of recommendations 
(OECD, 2008). In becoming the 24th formal DAC member on January 1, 2010, South Korea was 
obligated to improve the quality of its ODA. The United Nations encourages donor countries to meet the 
ODA target as 0.7% of their Gross National Income (GNI). This threshold was first raised in the Report of 
the Commission on International Development (Pearson, 1969). Although there’s no clear explanation of 
how the target was estimated, the 0.7 percent threshold was mentioned in several cases such as the 
“Earth Summit” in Rio de Janeiro 1992 and the final declaration of the UN’s International Conference on 
Financing for Development in Monterrey 2002 (Clemens & Moss, 2007). Figure 3.2 plots the average 
level of DAC donors’ total ODA as a percent of GNI and Korea’s relative position as a new donor. It is 
evident that South Korea’s level is below the average DAC level, but its ODA/GNI ratio had been 
increasing steadily from 0.02% in 1990 to 0.14% in 2012. In addition, the Korean government has 
committed to triple its ODA volume to USD 3 billion or 0.25% of its GNI by 2015 (MOFAT Ministry News).   
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Figure 3.2 Total ODA as Share of GNI (%) 
Despite the rapid increase in aid volume to developing countries, South Korea is not an influential 
donor in the DAC community when looking at the aid commitment data. As is shown in Table 3.1, the 
United State commits the highest amount of aid in general, with an exception in 2000 where Japan was 
the biggest donor. South Korea was the smallest donor in 1990 and committed about $56 million dollars. 
By 2012, South Korea accounted for 0.31% of total bilateral aid commitment on average, but was no 
longer the smallest donor.  
Table 3.1  
DAC ODA Commitment (2012 USD millions, constant price) 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2012 
all DAC 52218.07 76404.20 113064.10 93473.22 158141.54 143401.62 
number of 
DAC 
15 18 20 25 25 27 
max 
15388.52 
(US) 
15279.00 
(US) 
36788.12 
(US) 
19713.65 
(JPN) 
38516.07 
(US) 
30870.92 
(US) 
mean 3481.20 4244.68 5653.21 3738.93 6325.66 5311.17 
median 1741.99 2035.21 2310.38 2369.41 3065.70 2550.35 
min 
170.08 
(AUS) 
78.21 
(IRL) 
56.43 
(KOR) 
15.75 
(SVK) 
73.61 
(SVK) 
26.12 
(ISL) 
3.2.2 Turkey’s Transition  
Figure 3.3 plots Turkey’s net ODA flows for the period 1960-2014 in constant price. The solid line 
shows the net inflow of aid from 1960 to 2013 and represents Turkey as a recipient. Distinct from the 
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consistent decreasing aid inflow in South Korea, Turkey’s aid inflows fluctuated and had several peaks 
around 1980, 1991, and 2011 (see Figure 3.3). This sudden increase of aid inflows seems related to the 
economic performance when one compares Turkey’s aid inflow and its GDP. The dashed line shows the 
net outflow of aid since 1990 and represents Turkey as a donor. Its net aid disbursement had a sharp 
increase after 2010. Unlike Korea, Turkey has maintained its double identities as both an aid recipient 
and a donor.  
When comparing net aid disbursement between Turkey and South Korea, these two nations 
disbursed similar amount of aid initially but Turkey surpassed South Korea dramatically after 2011, 
although its GDP level is still significantly less than that of South Korea (see Figure 3.4). Like other DAC 
countries, Turkey also established the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) 
in 1992 to finance its foreign aid (Kulaklikaya & Nurdun, 2010). 
 
Figure 3.3 Turkey's Net Aid Flows (constant price: USD millions) 
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Figure 3.4 Net Aid Disbursement and Per-capita GDP (constant PPP price) 
3.3 Allocation Patterns as New Donors 
What are the motivations of South Korea and Turkey and do strategic considerations play an 
important role in determining their aid allocation? Based on the assumption that aid allocation patterns 
suggest the donors’ motivations, this section studies the ODA distribution by geographic regions and 
income groups for South Korea and Turkey. 
3.3.1 Motivations of New Donors’ Aid  
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) of Republic of Korea claims that “as a 
recipient-turned-donor, Korea is fully committed to supporting the global efforts to alleviate poverty, 
promote sustainable growth … and MDGs …” (MOFAT Ministry News). President Lee also described 
South Korea’s foreign assistance as a “wholehearted commitment to pay back its debts to the world as an 
international donor” (Kiyokazu, 2008).  
However, new donors may need a balance between the needs of their recipients and their own 
economic interests and strategic considerations. Walz and Ramachandran (2011) points out that the new 
donors’ participation in international aid cooperation systems may be driven more by the opportunity to 
build their profile in the multilateral institutions and spread more influence both regionally and globally. 
Moreover, compared to the poor countries, higher income nations could be more attractive to the donor 
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Turkey's aid Korea's aid
Korea's per capita GDP Turkey's per capita GDP
    
62 
 
community as they may carry more economic, political, and strategic weights. The literature does find an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between the recipients’ per-capita income and the per-capita aid they 
received. This is referred as the “middle-income bias” (Isenman, 1976; Dowling & Hiemenz, 1985). In 
addition, a World Bank study (Assessing aid, 1999) stated that the foreign aid would be more effective in 
eliminating poverty if it was allocated to the poorest countries especially those with sounder policies and 
institutions. This argument is carried into the Monterrey Consensus in 2002 (United Nations, 2002). 
Therefore, this essay focuses on the aid distribution across both geographic regions and income groups 
to explore how important strategic considerations are to South Korea and Turkey.    
The following section will examine several patterns: (i) the evolution of South Korea and Turkey’s 
aid distribution by geographic regions and income groups; (ii) the similarity of the foreign aid policy 
between the two new donors and Japan. Beyond its role as South Korea’s neighboring predecessor, 
Japan was among the earliest donors that joined the DAC and it is also a significant donor in terms of its 
aid volume (see Figure 3.5 and Table 3.1).  
 
Figure 3.5 DAC Members and Dates of Membership 
Again, foreign aid data are retrieved from OECD/DAC Aid Statistics. Net disbursements (gross 
disbursements less repayments) data in constant prices are used for the rest of the essay unless stated 
otherwise. Net disbursement is preferred because it could reflect the actual transfer of aid. The essay 
follows the World Bank’s thresholds in categorizing recipient countries into different geographic regions 
and income groups.   
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3.3.2 Aid Allocation by Geographic Regions  
World Bank categorizes developing countries into 6 geographical regions: East Asia and Pacific, 
Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, and 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Some characteristics of these six regions are summarized in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2  
Geographic Regions Defined by the World Bank 
Region 
Number of 
Countries 
Population 
(million) 
Population 
Growth Rate 
Avg Life 
Expectancy 
GNI per 
capita ($) 
Latin America and the Caribbean 29 582 1.1% 74 years 7733 
Europe and Central Asia 23 405 0.4% 71 years 7272 
Middle East and North Africa 13 331 1.7% 72 years 3874 
East Asia and Pacific 24 1900 0.7% 72 years 3696 
Sub-Saharan Africa 47 853 2.5% 54 years 1776 
South Asia 8 1600 1.4% 65 years 1176 
Note. Data are from the World Bank website. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-
classifications/country-and-lending-groups 
Regarding recipients’ geographic regions, South Korea’s aid net disbursement (in constant 
prices) is plotted in Figure 3.6. The panel on the left shows the aid volume as well as the composition 
across six regions. It is evident that disbursement flows were in the steady increase phase until early 
2000s. This seems to be consistent with South Korea’s stated motivation of supporting MDGs. Then the 
sudden decrease of aid disbursement appears to coincide with the recent global financial crisis although 
the impact did not last long. The aid volume recovered in the following year. A second observation is that 
Asian recipients especially East Asia is a priority for South Korea. For the period of 1987-2011, South 
Korea on average allocated 59% of its total bilateral aid to Asian countries with 41% to East Asia and 18% 
to South Asia. This is clearer on the right panel of Figure 3.6 where each year’s total ODA takes 100%. It 
seems to have a regime change in early 1990s where good amount of financial resources were 
distributed to Sub-Saharan Africa. For example, Sub-Saharan Africa received 5% of South Korea’s 
foreign assistance in 1987 but this number increased to more than 82% in 1990. Around the new 
millennium, Europe and Central Asia got some attention with about 19% of Japan’s bilateral aid in 1999, 
17% in 2000, and 12% in 2001, when compare to 2% on average before 1999. For the period 2003-2006, 
priority to some extent was given to countries in the Middle East and North Africa (29% on average 
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compared with 5% prior to this period).  
 
Figure 3.6 Evolution of South Korea’s ODA Distribution by Geographic Regions 
Similarly, Japan’s aid disbursement (in constant price) across geographic regions also 
concentrates on Asian countries (see Figure 3.7). For the entire period, about 73% of Japan’s bilateral aid 
was provided to developing Asian countries with 50% to East Asia and 23% to South Asia. Sub-Saharan 
Africa received consistent support after 1980 with an average of 19% of Japan’s total bilateral aid. It 
seems to have a regime change in recent years (since 2006). Priorities are shifted from East Asia (14% 
on average) to South Asia (27% on average), Sub-Saharan Africa (31% on average), and Middle East 
and North Africa (15% on average, 38% in 2005, 40% in 2008).     
 The aid allocation across geographic regions is compared between South Korea and Japan 
annually from 1987 to 2011 via Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test. It fails to reject the null hypothesis of equality of 
distribution between these two donors level (see Table 3.3). 
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Figure 3.7 Evolution of Japan’s ODA Distribution by Geographic Regions 
Table 3.3  
Comparisons between new donors and Japan regarding Aid Distribution across Regions 
 P_value for two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
Korea / Japan 0.389 
Turkey / Japan 0.000*** 
***p < .01. 
As is shown in Figure 3.8, Turkey’s aid initially focused heavily on Europe and Central Asia. In the 
recent years, Turkey also gives reasonably proportion to South Asia and Middle East and North Africa. 
For example, suggested in the right panel, in the year 2011 32% of its ODA was allocated to South Asia, 
followed by 28% to Middle East and North Africa and 25% to Europe and Central Asia. However, it rejects 
the null hypothesis of equality of distribution between Turkey and Japan regarding their aid allocation 
across recipients’ geographic regions (see Table 3.3). 
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Figure 3.8 Evolution of Turkey’s ODA Distribution by Geographic Regions 
3.3.3 Aid Allocation by Recipients’ Income Levels  
Using the Atlas method, the World Bank divides economies into four income groups based on 
their GNI per capita: Low Income Countries (LICs), Lower Middle Income Countries (LMICs), Upper 
Middle Income Countries (UMICs), and High Income Countries (HICs). The thresholds for four income 
groups vary over time but recipient countries maintain in the same categories in general. In this section, 
the ODA allocation by income groups for each donor is plotted by the thresholds of 2012 GNI per capita. 
Such thresholds are summarized in Table 3.4. I also checked different annual thresholds and the results 
are consistent. 
Table 3.4  
Thresholds of Income Groups by the World Bank 
 2012 GNI per capita 
LICs $1,035 or less 
LMICs $1,036 - $4,085 
UMICs $4,086 - $12,615 
HICs $12,616 
Note. Data are from the World Bank Website. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-
classifications/country-and-lending-groups#Low_income 
South Korea’s aid disbursement (in constant price) by income groups is plotted in Figure 3.9. In 
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general, the aid volume to its recipients increased sharply during the whole period (see the left panel). 
The downturns appeared to coincide with the financial crisis in late 1990s and late 2000s. The right panel 
weighs the annual total given aid as 100%. This ignores the amount of aid and focuses only on its 
distribution and thus enables the analysis of its evolution. For the entire period, about 52% of Japan’s 
bilateral aid is allocated to LIMCs on average followed by 26% to UMICs, 21% to LICs, and 1% to HIEs. It 
is observed that South Korea initially gave the LICs and LMICs similar weight. For example, in 1987, 
about 37% of its bilateral aid went to LICs and 44% to LMICs. This seems to be a strong priority towards 
the LMICs in early 1990s as South Korea allocated about 95% of its bilateral aid to LMICs in 1990 
although this number dropped to 74% in 1993. The UMICs also increased its weight since 1990s. Prior to 
1993, the UMICs received an average of 12% of South Korea’s total bilateral aid. This number increased 
to about 21%, 33%, and 60% in 1994, 1995, and 1996 respectively and remained 30% on average after 
that. Around the time of the 9/11 terror attack, there was a sudden increase of aid to HIEs (8% in 2001 
and 10% in 2002). In recent years, South Korea has had a consistent favor towards LMICs.  
 
Figure 3.9 Evolution of South Korea’s ODA Distribution by Income Groups 
Turkey’s aid allocation had strong favors for the UMICs initially. As is shown in Figure 3.10, prior 
to 1995, on average 72% of Turkey’s aid went to UMICs with 100% in 1991. In the new millennium, this 
weight dropped but UMICs remained their chief attraction. Financial resources were also shared with 
LMICs and LICs. In recent years (since 2005), aid was distributed more equally towards LICs, LMICs, and 
UMICs.  
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Figure 3.10 Evolution of Turkey’s ODA Distribution by Income Groups 
When comparing two donors aid allocation across recipients’ income groups, it fails to reject the 
null hypothesis of equality of distribution for both South Korea and Turkey (see Table 3.5). 
Table 3.5  
Comparisons between new donors and Japan regarding Aid Distribution across Income groups 
 P_value for two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
Korea / Japan 0.642 
Turkey / Japan 0.733 
***p < .01. 
3.4 Conclusion 
The global aid system has undergone significant changes with the emergence of new donors. 
This essay begins to explore the motivation of new donors and to evaluate the impact of new donors on 
the current foreign aid system. This essay chooses two nations: South Korea and Turkey. Unlike 
emerging economies such as China and India, whose reliable quantitative data are hard to find, South 
Korea and Turkey have well-defined ODA programs, efficient development agency to finance their aid, as 
well as comprehensive statistical reporting system. Moreover, South Korea is an important case because 
it is the first nation which successfully completed the transition from an aid recipient to a donor and 
eventually joined DAC. Given this specific history, it is important to examine whether such a recipient-
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turned donor would have a different perspective on the needs of recipients’ countries when compared to 
traditional donors.  
Besides the goal of poverty reduction, donors may have certain strategic considerations when 
determining their aid allocation. Such political and strategic considerations could be reflected in their aid 
distribution across recipients’ geographic regions and income level. This essay adopts the World Bank 
thresholds of geographic regions and income groups to analyze the ODA allocation of South Korea and 
Turkey. As donors are not monolithic, it is not surprising to find that South Korea and Turkey have different 
aid delivery patterns. In the regional distribution, South Korea’s bilateral aid concentrates on developing 
Asian countries especially East Asia in general. Comparing South Korea with its neighboring predecessor 
Japan, similarities include the priority to Asian developing countries although in recent years Japan has 
been shaping its bilateral aid from East Asia to South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. On the other hand, 
Turkey favors countries in Europe and Central Asia. A reasonable proportion of its bilateral aid goes to 
South Asia and Middle East and North Africa in recent years. In terms of aid distribution across income 
groups, South Korea favors LICs while Turkey favors UMICs.  
Such findings could to some extent provide evidence that strategic considerations and even 
economic interests play important roles in aid determination for both South Korea and Turkey. 
Establishing aid relations with neighboring countries and middle income countries may help new donors 
create opportunities to spread their regional influence, promote international trade, and facilitate the 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). In fact, some papers find that strategic considerations as well as the 
trade and investment concerns with recipient countries are important determinants for aid for South Korea 
and Turkey (Chun, et al., 2010; Kang & Lee & Park, 2011; Kulaklikaya & Nurdun, 2010; Park, et al., 
2008).  
This essay finds little evidence regarding the change in aid patterns following systemic shock. On 
one hand, the 9/11 terror attack moderately changed the ODA allocation by geographic regions for South 
Korea but not Turkey. On the other hand, both donors disbursed less aid volume following the recent 
financial crisis but maintained the same distribution pattern. 
When comparing with traditional DAC donors, this essay did not find adequate evidence that new 
donors have less strategic considerations and economic interests. This is in line with the finding in Walz 
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and Ramachandran (2011) that South Korea and Turkey constitute DAC followers. Although this essay 
mainly focuses on the cases of South Korea and Turkey, it could shed lights on a broader exploration of 
other emerging donors such as the Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. 
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